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Article
TERROR VICTIMS AT THE MUSEUM GATES: TESTING THE
COMMERCIAL ACTITY EXCEPTION UNDER THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
ALICIA M. HILTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE that you are sharing a meal with friends at an outdoor cafe.
Suddenly, three Hamas suicide bombers detonate improvised explosive
devices packed with shrapnel and chemical poisons. Five innocent people
are killed, and nearly two hundred are injured. You survive the attack, but
burns cover more than forty percent of your body, and you suffer over one
hundred shrapnel entry wounds. Surgeons will insert a steel plate in one
of your legs, and you have permanent nerve damage in your hands, perfo-
rated eardrums, chronic infections, scarring, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and depression. Medical bills will wreck your finances. Hamas's
assets are exceedingly difficult to reach in any court, but the foreign gov-
ernment that sponsors Hamas owns priceless artifacts on loan to American
museums. Do these cultural treasures offer a remedy for your injuries?
This terror victim above is not a hypothetical one. Noam Rozenman
was a victim of a September 1997 Hamas terror attack in Jerusalem and is
one of the nine plaintiffs in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran.1 Iran trained
and financed the Hamas suicide bombers who detonated the explosions at
* Visiting Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law; J.D., 1997, The University of
Chicago Law School; B.A. in Sociology, 1988, The University of California at
Berkeley. Prior to practicing law, the author was a fine art consultant in San
Francisco art galleries and an FBI Special Agent in New York. As an FBI Special
Agent, the author was a member of a foreign counterintelligence squad and also
worked undercover in two long-term criminal cases, posing as a drug dealer with
ties to organized crime.
1. 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (N.D. II1. 2004); see also Rubin v. Hamas, No. 02-0975
(RMU), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20883, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (describing
claims for damages for personal injury and other torts due to injuries sustained at
suicide bombing); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258,
267 (D.D.C. 2003) (detailing Rozenman's injuries from bombing). After ob-
taining default judgment against Iran, the Rubin plaintiffs filed suit against Hamas
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2008). See Rubin, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20883, at
*3 (detailing nature of suit). Hamas failed to appear or respond, and the court
entered a default judgment against Hamas. See id. at *8-11 (describing outcome of
suit). The court used its previous findings of fact from Campuzano and trebled
damages pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act's provision for recovery of threefold
damages. See id. at *9-11 (setting forth damages award). As of this writing, the
plaintiffs have not succeeded in recovering their awarded damages from Iran.
(479)
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a crowded pedestrian mall.2 Americans injured by the attack brought suit
in the United States against Iran, its Ministry of Information and Security
and senior Iranian officials under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) .3
The Rubin plaintiffs won a default judgment against Iran for $71.5
million in compensatory damages. 4 Nevertheless, more than ten years af-
ter the attacks, the plaintiffs in that case have yet to realize any meaningful
recovery. 5 Iran has minimal assets in the United States. Accordingly, the
Rubin plaintiffs have identified as their only meaningful source of recovery
priceless Persian artifacts on loan from Iran to American museums and
other Persian artifacts held by American museums that may belong to
Iran. 6 In the Rubin suit-now before a federal district court in Chicago-
the plaintiffs seek to attach the Persepolis Tablets, the Chogha Mish Col-
lection, the Herzfeld Collection at the Field Museum of Natural History
and other Persian artifacts owned by Iran that are held at the University of
Chicago's famed Oriental Institute. 7 If the Rubin plaintiffs succeed, they
may seek to attach Iranian-owned Persian collections held at other Ameri-
can museums.
8
2. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (recounting testimony of experts Dr.
Patrick Clawson, Dr. Bruce Tefft and Yigal Pressler regarding Iranian involvement
with Hamas).
3. See id. at 261 (setting forth parties to suit and describing bombing).
4. See id. at 274-77 (detailing compensatory damages awarded to plaintiffs).
The court also awarded the plaintiffs $300 million in punitive damages, but Iran's
status as a foreign sovereign prevented that punitive damages award from being
levied against Iran, and the award was instead levied jointly against the other de-
fendants. See id. at 277-79 (detailing punitive damages award granted to plaintiffs).
The court called upon longstanding precedent and arrived at the figure of $300
million by multiplying Iran's annual expenditure on terrorism by three. See id. at
278 (providing court's rationale for damages award).
5. See Telephone Interviews with David Strachman, Counsel for the Rubin
plaintiffs (Mar. 20-21, 2007) [hereinafter Strachman Interviews]; see also Plaintiffs'
Consolidated Memorandum of Law at 5 nn.2-4, Rubin v. Hamas, No. 02-0975
(RMU), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20883 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2004) (noting that plain-
tiffs had not yet received monetary compensation and stating that United States
District Court for Northern District of Texas had permitted plaintiffs to attach
house in Texas that was formerly residence of Iranian prince). The house was sold
for approximately $390,000. See id. (stating price at which plaintiffs sold Texas
house). After deduction of out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the plaintiffs-
both at trial and during their collection proceedings-the proceeds from the sale
of the house yielded only a nominal amount of recovery for each plaintiff. See id.
(indicating that after expenses, plaintiffs did not have significant monetary gain
from award of house).
6. See Strachman Interviews, supra note 5 (noting that Persian artifacts are
only available remedy for plaintiffs).
7. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-CV-9370, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54983, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2007) (stating that plaintiffs sought to attach
Persian artifacts held by University of Chicago).
8. See Strachman Interviews, supra note 5 (explaining that Rubin plaintiffs may
seek to attach Iranian artifacts currently in United States to damages award).
[Vol. 53: p. 479
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The University of Chicago, the Field Museum and other American
museums view these terror victims as a threat to their institutional mission
to study, exhibit and preserve the artistic treasures of ancient civilizations. 9
Perhaps uncomfortably, they have found themselves allied with Iran and
against the Rubin plaintiffs in this novel legal battle.
The Rubin case presages a wave of future suits as terrorists increasingly
target United States citizens. 10 Between 2005 and 2006, the number of
terrorist attacks worldwide rose by twenty-five percent, and the number of
deaths caused by terrorists rose by forty percent." Non-classified data in-
dicates that another terrorist attack on the scale of September 11th is
likely to be attempted in the United States. 12 Even if no attack is success-
fully launched on the United States, Americans who work and live over-
seas-both soldiers and non-combatants-will continue to be a prime
target of terror attacks. How these victims and tort plaintiffs should be
compensated when the perpetrators appear to lack assets subject to attach-
ment in the United States is a growing problem that cannot be ignored.
This Article examines terror victims' rights to recover against the cul-
tural property of state sponsors of the terrorism that did them harm.
Under the FSIA, foreign states are presumed immune from suit in United
States courts. 13 The only way to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state
defendant in an American court is to bring suit under one of the FSIA's
immunity exceptions. 14 Using the Rubin suit as an example of the obsta-
cles faced by terror victims, this Article analyzes several FSIA amendments
and focuses particularly on the FSIA's "commercial activity" and "commer-
9. See, e.g., Amy Braverman Puma, Worth millions . .. or Priceless?, U. OF CHI.
MAG., Oct. 2006, at 18-19 (noting that director of Oriental Institute Gil Stein has
stated that University of Chicago has "deep sympathy for the victims," but that sale
of Persepolis tablets at auction would be "terrible tragedy" because scholarly infor-
mation about 2,500 year-old tablets' historical significance would be lost); see also
Lydialye Gibon, Original Source: Take One Tablet, U. OF CHI. MAC., Nov.-Dec. 2007, at
29 (describing rare tablet that is in possession of Oriental Institute and is subject to
plaintiffs' lawsuit).
10. See NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., REPORT ON TERRORIST INCI-
DENTs-2006 2, 12-13 (Apr. 30, 2007), http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/crot2006nct-
cannexfinal.pdf (documenting rise in terrorist attacks).
11. See id. at 2 (providing statistics on terrorist attacks and specifically noting
recent increase in frequency of such attacks).
12. See, e.g., Kelli Arena, Al Qaeda sharpening U.S. focus, officials fear, CNN, July
13, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/07/13/terror.threat/index.html (indi-
cating that future terrorist attack similar to September 11th attacks may be on
horizon); Bryan Bender, Al Qaeda seen reborn as key threat, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18,
2007, at Al (same); Spencer S. Hsu & Mary Beth Sheridan, IffDs Seen As Rising
Threat in the US., WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2007, at Al (same); Mark Mazzetti, Intelli-
gence Chief Says Al Qaeda Improves Ability to Strike in US., N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2008, at
Al (same).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2008) ("[T]he property in the United States of a
foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution except as
provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.").
14. See id. § 1602 et seq. (providing that federal and state courts are to decide
claims of immunity made by foreign states in accordance with that chapter).
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cial use" exceptions.15 The Article concludes that, with respect to cultural
property, those exceptions should be construed narrowly.' 6
Part II of this Article considers Rubin as well as Congress's response to
the rising wave of global terrorism through the enactment of the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the Civil Liability for
Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism Act (Flatow Amendment), the Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) and the National Defense Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Defense Act).1 7 Although these legislative
reforms have enabled terror victims to win victories in court, plaintiffs
have had to surmount other obstacles to recovery, including the Executive
branch's intervention to block collection of judgments; such obstacles
confound Congress's intent to provide effective remedies for terror
victims.' 8
Part III discusses both the legislative history of the FSIA and the com-
mercial use exception as a tool for plaintiffs to obtain remedies for injuries
caused by a foreign government. 19 Under the commercial use exception,
a foreign state's property "used for commercial activity in the United
States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of
a State". 20 Loans of art from a foreign government to an American mu-
seum have been found to constitute commercial activity. 2' Moreover, the
commercial activities of an agent endowed with actual authority-such as
an American museum that exhibits loaned art-can be attributed to the
principal: the foreign government that loaned the art.22
15. See id. § 1605(a) (setting forth commercial activity exception); id.
§ 1610(a) (2) (setting forth commercial use exception).
16. For a further discussion of this Article's conclusion that the commercial
use and commercial activity exceptions should be construed narrowly, see infra
notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the AEDPA, the Flatow Amendment, the TRIA
and the Defense Act, see infra notes 71-150 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANsius, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS, § 3:76 (2007) (describing obstacles to recovery for plain-
tiffs); Anthony Lin, 'Excruciatingly Slow' Testimony Results in Added Discovery, 238 N.Y.
L. J. 1 (2007) (same); Josh Gerstein, Court Ruling Could Impede Seizure of Terror
Funds, N.Y. SUN, July 20, 2007, available at http://www2.nysun.com/article/58852
(same).
19. For a further discussion of the FSIA's legislative history and use of the
commercial use exception, see infra notes 176-238 and accompanying text.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2) (2008) (setting forth commercial use exception).
21. SeeMalewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 314 (D.D.C. 2005)
(stating that loan of art from government to museum constitutes "commercial
activity").
22. See, e.g., Virtual Def. & Dev. Int'l, Inc. v. Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5
(D.D.C. 1999) (analogizing art loan arrangements between museum and foreign
government to agency relationship); see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No.
03-C9370, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24376, at *26-27 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007) (noting
that language in FSIA § 1610 better supports agency argument than does language
of § 1605).
[Vol. 53: p. 479
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The Rubin court has already "held that Iran's conduct was not com-
mercial, and that Iran's conduct is what triggers the commercial activity
exception." 23 Currently, the Rubin plaintiffs are pursuing an agency the-
ory of recovery, and are asserting "that Iran engaged in commercial activ-
ity through the actions of Iran's agent, the University of Chicago. '24 It
appears unlikely, however, that the University of Chicago's Oriental Insti-
tute had actual authority to act as an agent on Iran's behalf. Indeed, the
nature of the relationship between Iran and the Oriental Institute is prob-
ably more analogous to that of a bailor and bailee than to a principal and
agent.2
5
As a sovereign custodian of its country's cultural property, Iran
loaned the artifacts to the Oriental Institute for research, analysis, catalog-
ing and conservation. 26 Rather than employing the long-term loan of the
Persepolis Tablets and Chogha Mish Collections as a profit-making enter-
prise, the Oriental Institute has expended tremendous resources on re-
search and conservation. 27 Under the FSIA and the common law of
agency, the court should hold that the Persepolis Tablets are not amena-
ble to attachment under the FSIA's commercial use exception.
Part IV of this Article examines museums' ethical obligations when
interacting with foreign governments, and describes dealings between
American museums and foreign governments that constitute commercial
activity by that foreign government under the FSIA. 28 Although museums
may characterize themselves as bastions of learning and culture, their in-
creasing commercialization blurs the line between culture and com-
merce. 29 In pursuit of revenue amidst today's competitive economic
environment, museums have increasingly focused on blockbuster exhibits
that drive ticket sales, gift shop revenues and corporate sponsorship
deals. 3
0
23. Rubin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24376, at *23.
24. Id. at *22.
25. See id. at *24-25 (describing letters exchanged between Iran and Oriental
Institute in 1930s and 1940s regarding loan of artifacts).
26. See id. (discussing nature of relationship between Iran and Oriental
Institute).
27. See Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, Persepolis Fortification
Archive [hereinafter Persepolis Fortification Archive], https://oi.uchicago.edu/
research/projects/pfa/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) (describing Oriental Institute's
conservation efforts).
28. For a further discussion of what constitutes commercial activity, see infra
notes 251-82 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Mark Honigsbaum, McGuggenheim, GuAIAN, Jan. 27, 2001, at 4
(criticizing commercial nature of museums); Alan Riding, The Louvre's Art: Priceless.
The Louvre's Name: Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at El (noting that museums
have become increasingly commercial); Alan Riding, France Frets as Louvre Looks
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at El (same).
30. See, e.g., ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM DiRs., MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN ART MUSEUMS AND CORPORATE SPONSORS 1-2 (May 2007) [hereinafter ART
MUSEUMS AND CORPORATE SPONSORS], http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/
CorporateSponsors clean06-2007doc.pdf (detailing struggle between maintaining
5
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Some museums have been criticized for straying from their mission as
educators and stewards of cultural property in their pursuit of profit. Spe-
cifically, critics assert that museums have engaged in contractual arrange-
ments that both create conflicts of interest and stretch ethical boundaries.
To induce foreign governments to loan their art treasures for blockbuster
exhibits, American museums have even paid exorbitant nine-figure fees to
repressive foreign governments that commit human rights violations. 3 1
Revenue-sharing arrangements such as these are clear examples of com-
mercial activity under the FSIA.
Part V describes presently existing legislation that protects foreign-
owned cultural property from seizure, and explains why a grant of immu-
nity under the federal Immunity From Seizure Act (IFSA) provides most
foreign lenders with sufficient assurances that their cultural property will
not be subject to attachment and execution while that property is loaned
to an American cultural institution.
32
Part VI considers the broader policy implications that such legislation
has for the war on terror and the preservation of cultural property.3 3 Al-
though museums may assert that terror victim plaintiffs will be poor guard-
ians of the art treasures they seek to attach, the fundamentalist regimes
that sponsor terrorism have a dismal track record as protectors of ancient
artifacts. 34 Returning cultural property to Iran, for example, may result in
that property's loss or destruction. In Iran, a portion of the Palace of Da-
rius was recently destroyed by vandals who used bulldozers to attack the
archeological site.3 5 Similarly, in Afghanistan, priceless Buddhist art and
monuments were destroyed by the Taliban as a political and religious ges-
high revenue and dedication to culture); Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DiRs., EXHIBITION
COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN AMERICAN ART MUSEUMS AND FoR-PROFIT ENTERPRISES 1-
3 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter EXHIBITION COLLABORATIONS], http://www.aamd.org/
papers/documents/ComercialcollaborationsFINAL.pdf (same); see also, Alan G.
Artner, "Tut" is all show, no art, CHI. TRiB., June 4, 2006, http://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/entertainment/chi-060604tut,1 ,6415567.story (criticizing Tut exhibit as
being too commercial); William Mullen, This Fossil Rocks: The Field Museum's Dino-
saur Coup Promises to Turn the Blockbuster Exhibit into a Whole Different Animal, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 26, 1998 [hereinafter Mullen, This Fossil Rocks] (noting "blockbuster"
nature of Field Museum's Tyrannosaurus rex exhibit).
31. See, e.g., William Mullen, Tut, Tut, Tut: A Tiff at the Tut Exhibit, CHI. TRIB.,
May 25, 2006, http://www.chicagotr-ibnne.com/entertainment/chi-0605250163
may25,1,1 360039.story?page= I&cset=true&ctrack=2 [hereinafter Mullen, Tut, Tut,
Tut] (describing Egypt's loan of Tut artifacts to American museums and instant
revenue sharing arrangement); Human Rights Watch, Egypt Events of 2007, http:/
/hrw.org/englishwr2k8/docs/2008/01/31/egyptl7595.htm (last visited April 21,
2008) (describing human right violations that occurred in Egypt in 2007).
32. For a further discussion of legislation that protects foreign-owned cultural
property, see infra notes 283-311 and accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of policy implications, see infra notes 312-23 and
accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Maryam Tabeshian, Palace of Darius the Great Discovered in Bolaghi
Gorge, CHN, May 15, 2006, available at http://www.chnpress.com/news/Print?Sec-
tion=2&id=6374 (noting Islamic regime's poor caretaking of artifacts).
35. See id. (describing vandalism at Palace of Darius).
[Vol. 53: p. 479
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ture of defiance.3 6 Furthermore, terrorist organizations-particularly in
the Middle East-have funded their operations in part through the sale of
artifacts and antiquities.3 7 The applicable federal statutes, however, do
not provide the courts the authority to weigh such policy considerations. 3 8
Thus, despite the risk that the Persepolis Tablets may be damaged or de-
stroyed if they are returned to Iran, the Rubin court must apply existing
law, and cannot base its ruling on public policy considerations.
This Article concludes that the Rubin court should not hold that the
plaintiffs have the legal right to attach the Persepolis Tablets, the Chogha
Mish Collection or the Herzfeld Collection. 9 If, however, terror victims
do prevail in court against state sponsors of terrorism, and cultural prop-
erty is attached, the sale of the property should be conducted in a method
that respects its scholarly value and its significance for all of humankind.
A collection of cultural property such as the Persepolis Tablets should be
sold as a single collection, not broken up and sold in pieces. Otherwise,
scholarly content will be lost. The United States government, American
museums, foreign museums and other American and foreign buyers
should be permitted to place bids at these judicially supervised auctions.
The United States government's intercession in litigation brought by
terror victims carries long-term foreign policy ramifications. But the De-
partment of Justice should not contravene the intent of Congress as ex-
pressed in the FSIA, the AEDPA, the Flatow Amendment, the TRIA or the
Defense Act. Unless congressional intent is satisfied, the legislation will
afford terror victims only rights without remedies. Furthermore, terror
victims will not need to target cultural property if they are permitted to
attach adequate cash, securities or real estate in order to satisfy judgments
against state sponsors of terrorism.
It is tragic that the Rubin plaintiffs and others have suffered grievous
wounds from senseless acts of terrorism. But it is corrosive on society as a
whole when the security of cultural property is threatened. At the least,
judicial recognition that the FSIA amendments make cultural property
vulnerable to attachment should discourage state sponsors of terrorism
36. See Neal Ascherson, "Heritage Terrorism" is a Way of Sticking Two Fingers up at
West, OBSERVER, Mar. 4, 2001 (describing destruction of artifacts in Afghanistan);
see alsoJim Shorthose, Unlawful Instruments and Goods: Afghanistan, Culture and the
Taliban, CAPITAL & CLASS, Apr. 1, 2003, at I (indicating that artifacts have been
destroyed in Afghanistan).
37. See, e.g., MATHEW BOGDANOS & WILLIAM PATRICK, THIEVES OF BAGHDAD
249 (Bloomsbury 2005) (noting that terrorist organizations often use artifacts as
source of capital); Joel Leyden, Swif/I-Find: Terrorism Funded By Stolen Property, ISRAEL
NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.israelnewsagency.com/terrorismstolen
propertyswiftfindregistry881016.html (same); Laura de la Torre, Terrorists Raise
Cash by Selling Antiquities, GOVT SECURITY NEWS, Feb. 20, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/cms/lib/399.pdf (same).
38. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610(a) (failing to provide courts with means
to consider policy in making decisions).
39. For a further discussion of this article's conclusion, see infra notes 324-30
and accompanying text.
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from trafficking in artifacts as commerce, and encourage museums to act
in their traditional roles as stewards of cultural property for all
humankind.
II. RuBiN V. IsLAMiC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
A. The Persepolis Tablets
The Rubin case has the makings of a blockbuster movie: intrepid
archeologists unearth Persian cultural treasures and bring them to the
United States for study, then those precious artifacts become embroiled in
terrorism, murder and international intrigue. The case has been com-
pared to the film Indiana Jones.40 Nevertheless, the events leading up to
the Rubin litigation are very real.4 '
In 1931, a team of archaeologists from the University of Chicago's
Oriental Institute began excavating at the site of the ruins of the imperial
residence complex at Persepolis-what is now Takhti-IJamshid-near Shi-
raz in southwestern Iran.4 2 Buried among the ruins of one of the palace's
fortification walls, they discovered more than 15,000 dried clay tablets and
thousands of additional tablet fragments referred to as "the single most
important surviving source of information about the organization of the
2,500 year old Persian Empire of Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes."43 In 1936,
Ernst Herzfeld and the other researchers from the Oriental Institute
brought the Persepolis Tablets to the Oriental Institute for analysis, trans-
lation and conservation. 4 4
Before they could be translated, each tablet and tablet fragment had
to be meticulously cleaned. Because they were dried when they were
made-rather than fired in a kiln-they are very fragile. Removing debris
is a slow, painstaking process. 45 Researchers at the Oriental Institute who
translated the tablets have gleaned a tremendous amount of information
about the social interactions, travels, trade arrangements and hierarchy of
the Achaemenid people.
46
The Persepolis Tablets were made during the middle of the reign of
Darius I, between 509 to 494 B.C.4 7 Most of the tablets are inscribed with
cuneiform writing that recorded the issuance of food and other supplies
by the palace bureaucracy to the people who worked for the Achaemenid
40. RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 1981).
41. See Strachman Interviews, supra note 5 (recognizing comparisons between
Rubin and RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK).
42. See Matthew Stolper, The Persepolis Fortification Tablets: What They Are, and
Why They're At Risk, ORIENTAL INST. NEWS & NOTES, Jan. 4, 2007, at 6 (describing
excavation that resulted in discovery of Persepolis tablets).
43. Gil Stein, A Heritage Threatened: The Persepolis Tablets Lawsuit and the Oriental
Institute, ORIENTAL INsT. NEWS & NOTES, Jan. 4, 2007, at 3.
44. See id. (explaining how tablets arrived at Chicago Oriental Institute).
45. See id. (discussing cleaning process used on tablets).
46. See id. (establishing significance of tablets).
47. See id. (identifying "narrow time range" of tablets).
[Vol. 53: p. 479
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imperial organization. 48 Some of the tablets also bear the impressions of
cylinder seals. 49 Because seal impressions on the tablets are dated within
such a narrow window of time, art historians have been able to use them as
a reference to date the use of specific types of pictorial images. 50
After the tablets were cleaned, studied and photographed in Chicago,
the Oriental Institute began to ship them back to Iran in batches.51 In
1948, 179 tablets were returned, and in 1951, 37,000 tablet fragments were
shipped back to Iran. 52 Decades passed as Oriental Institute researchers
continued to clean and translate the remaining tablets held in their safe-
keeping. 53 Periodically, Oriental Institute researchers published informa-
tion about the tablets to share their treasure-trove of new knowledge about
ancient Persia.54 Meanwhile, turmoil brewed halfway across the world in
the Middle East.
B. The Attack
Jerusalem's Ben-Yehuda Street pedestrian mall is a favorite terrorist
target because it is located along one of the city's main streets. 55 The
destruction raged by the September 4, 1997 bombing devastated the pe-
destrian mall.56 On that day, people had gathered on the mall to shop,
dine and enjoy the pleasant weather.5 7 One of the suicide bombers-who
was disguised as a woman-blew himself up outside of a caf6. 5 8 Seconds
later, the other two bombers blew themselves up at different positions
along Ben-Yehuda Street.59 "The bombers packed the bombs with nails,
screws, pieces of glass, and chemical poisons to cause maximum pain, suf-
48. See id. (describing inscriptions on tablets).
49. See id. (identifying other significant impressions on tablets).
50. See id. (discussing broader significance of tablets).
51. See id. at 4 (noting that after analysis, tablets were sent back to Iran).
52. See id. (noting return of some tablets and fragments).
53. See id. (discussing care of tablets remaining in Institute's possession).
54. See id. (describing Institute's noncommercial purpose of sharing informa-
tion gleaned from tablets).
55. See Yair Sheleg, A Short History of Terror, HAARETZ.COM, Mar. 12, 2001,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=101419 (discussing
pedestrian mall's vulnerability to terror attacks).
56. See id. (describing destruction caused by Ben-Yehuda Street mall
bombing).
57. See id. (noting that bombing occurred during afternoon, when pedestrian
mall was crowded).
58. See id. (describing bombing).
59. See id. (same).
487
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fering, and death."6(' The explosions shattered windows and tore through
walls.6 1 Awnings and roofs collapsed; victims flew through the air.
6 2
Hamas claimed responsibility for the senseless attack, which killed five
people and injured nearly two hundred more. 63 Significantly, then-Secre-
tary of State Madeleine Albright had planned to visit the region a week
later as part of peace talks. 64 Some political commentators posited that
the terror attack was partially motivated by an intent to derail Albright's
visit.
6 5
C. Obtaining Judgment Against Iran
Americans who survived the Ben-Yehuda terrorist bombing but had
suffered permanent disabilities from their injuries seized a novel weapon
to fight back against the terrorists who caused their suffering: the United
States courts. On September 9, 2000, Diana Campuzano, Avi Elishis and
Gregg Salzman-the Campuzano plaintiffs-filed suit against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) and
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG). 66
Similarly, the Rubin plaintiffs are five individuals who were severely
and permanently injured in the bombing, and four of their respective rela-
tives-each of whom must devote time and resources to the victims' care
as a result of the injuries. 67 On July 31, 2001, the Rubin plaintiffs filed suit
against Iran, MOIS, and senior Iranian government officials Ayatollah Ali
Hoseini Khamenei, Ali Fallahian-Khuzestani and Ali Akbar Hashemi-Raf-
60. Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 (D.D.C.
2003) (describing bombs used).
61. See Andy Monfried, You Ain't Gonna Learn What You Don't Want To Know,
Jan. 27, 2006, http://andymonfried.blogspot.com/2006/01/israel-and-pa-elec-
tions_27.html (depicting destruction caused by bombing); Judy Woodruff & Jer-
rold Kessel, Hamas: The Culprit in the Suicide Bombing Attack in Jerusalem, CNN,
Sept. 4, 1997, available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9707/04/israel.blast.
930/ (same).
62. See Monfried, supra note 61 (describing destruction caused by bombing).
63. See Woodruff & Kessel, supra note 61 (recalling that leaflet left at scene
contained "an ominous threat of more bombs, if demands to free prisoners [were]
not met"); see also Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (describing bombing).
64. See Woodruff & Kessel, supra note 61 (noting Albright's planned visit); see
also Deadly Attack, JIM LEHRER ONLINE NEWS HOUR, Sept. 4, 1997, http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle-east/j uly-dec97/bomb_9-4.html [hereinafter
Deadly Attack] (same).
65. See, e.g., Deadly Attack, supra note 64 (noting belief that bombing may have
been motivated by desire to dissuade Albright from coming).
66. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (identifying Campuzano plaintiffs
and describing suit).
67. See id. (identifying Rubin plaintiffs). The injured plaintiffs are Jenny
Rubin, Daniel Miller, Abraham Mendelson, Stuart Hersh and Noam Rozenman.
See id. (same). The family member plaintiffs are Deborah Rubin, Renay Frym,
Elena Rozenman and Tzvi Rozenman. See id. (same).
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sanjani.68 The cases were filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. 69 Jurisdiction was based on FSIA.
70
In order to establish subject matter jurisdiction over Iran, the plain-
tiffs were forced to invoke an exception to Iran's sovereign immunity. 7 1
Specifically, the plaintiffs in both cases sought to invoke both the AEDPA
and the Flatow Amendment.
The AEDPA is a 1996 amendment to the FSIA that enables terror
victims such as the Rubin plaintiffs to gain subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign governments that provide material support to terrorists. 72 The
AEDPA was enacted shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing, at a time
when Congress was aware of the urgent need to enact new legislation to
discourage further acts of terrorism from being attempted either on Amer-
ican soil or abroad. Under the AEDPA, foreign states are stripped of im-
munity when:
[M]oney damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of ma-
terial support or resources . . . for such an act if such an act or
provision of material support is engaged in by an official, em-
ployee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.
73
The Flatow Amendment was enacted in a second congressional
amendment to the FSIA that came several months after the enactment of
the AEDPA.7 4 The Flatow Amendment was drafted to enable terror vic-
tims to recover in private causes of action for injuries incurred in attacks
perpetrated by state sponsors of terrorism:
68. See id. (identifying defendants in Rubin).
69. See id. (noting that both cases were filed in federal court in District of
Columbia).
70. See id. at 260 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2008)) (setting forth jurisdictional
basis for suit).
71. See id. at 269 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a) (7) (2003)) (stating that
plaintiffs were required to establish sovereign immunity exception in order to pro-
ceed with suit against Iran).
72. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7)
(2003).
73. § 1605(a) (7).
74. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7)
(2003). See generally Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998), abrogation recog-
nized by Haim v. Iran, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005). Alisa Flatow was murdered
in a Hamas suicide bombing while she was studying in Israel. See Flatow, 999 F.
Supp. at 7 (stating facts). Pursuant to what became known as the "Flatow Amend-
ment," Flatow's family sued Iran in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
See id. at 6-7. As in the Rubin proceeding, Iran failed to appear. See id. at 6 n.1.
Accordingly, the Flatow court found Iran responsible for sponsoring the terror at-
tack and awarded Flatow's estate compensatory and punitive damages and sola-
tium. See id. at 27-31. The Flatow case was the first of many cases brought by terror
victims against Iran and has set a precedent for future suits.
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An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism ... while acting within the scope of his
or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a United
States national.., for personal injury or death caused by acts of
that official, employee, or agent for which the courts of the
United States may maintain jurisdiction under [the AEDPA] for
money damages which may include economic damages, solatium,
pain, and suffering, and punitive damages.
75
The plaintiffs called upon both the AEDPA and the Flatow Amend-
ment to assert that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over Iran.
Moreover, the plaintiffs pointed to both amendments to argue that they
had proved Iran's liability pursuant to the FSIA.76 Because both cases
arose out of the same terror bombing, the two cases were consolidated. 77
1. Analyzing the Plaintiffs' Rights to Recover
Despite being properly served, Iran and the other defendants failed
to respond or appear in court.78 Accordingly, the court entered default
against the Campuzano defendants on December 6, 2001, and against the
Rubin defendants on March 6, 2002.7 9 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e),
the court could not enter the default judgment against Iran "unless the
claimant establishe[d] his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory
to the court."80 Accordingly, the court held a four-day evidentiary hearing
to satisfy that standard. 8'
Through expert testimony, the plaintiffs produced ample evidence
that satisfied the requirements of § 1608(e) .32 The court's findings of fact
listed numerous references that established Iran's and Iranian govern-
ment officials' key roles in the bombing, including that:
Iran provides ongoing terrorist training and economic assistance
to Hamas .... With Iranian government funds, MOIS spends
between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000 a year sponsoring terror-
ist activities of various organizations such as Hamas .... Iranian
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2003).
76. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
77. See id. at 261 (explaining consolidation of Campuzano and Rubin suits).
78. See Telephone Interview with Laina C. Wilk, Counsel for Iran (Mar. 21,
2007) (commenting that counsel for Iran did not have an answer for why Iran did
not appear). Counsel for Iran explained, "[w]e [Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe] re-
present the government of Iran in the McKessen case [McKessen Corp. v. Iran, No.
CIV.A. 82-220, 1997 WL 361177 (D.D.C.June 23, 1997)]. It is a twenty-five year old
case that has the biggest docket in the District Court of D.C. So Iran has been a
client for a long time. When Strachman [counsel for Rubin plaintiffs] filed the suit
seeking to attach, then Iran came to us.").
79. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2003).
81. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
82. See id. at 269.
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governmental support for terrorism is an official state policy and
the approval of high-ranking Iranian officials, including Ayatol-
lah Ali Hoseini Khamenie, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Ali
Fallahian-Khuzestani, was necessary for Iran and MOIS to sup-
port Hamas with training and economic assistance. Irans [sic]
support of Hamas could not have occurred without this senior
leadership approval .... The bombing also would not have oc-
curred without Iranian sponsorship. 8 3
Based upon a careful review of the evidence, the court concluded
that, under the requirements of the FSIA and its amendments, the "plain-
tiffs ha[d] gone beyond the necessary burden of 'evidence satisfactory to
the court' and ha[d] proven each element by clear and convincing evi-
dence."84 Specifically, the plaintiffs had established that their injuries re-
sulted from an extrajudicial killing perpetrated by Hamas; 85 that Hamas
had received material support from Iran and Iranian government officials;
that Iran was designated a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the
bombing;86 that the plaintiffs were United States citizens at the time of the
bombing and that similar conduct by American agents, officials or employ-
ees within the United States would be actionable.
87
In analyzing the plaintiffs' rights to recover, the court further con-
cluded that the "defendants [were] liable to the Rubin plaintiffs for the
common law torts of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress."88 As such, the plaintiffs had proved that Iran was liable,
and had established an exception to immunity pursuant to the FSIA.
Thus, the court granted the plaintiffs' motions for default judgment.89
2. Calculating Damages
In calculating the amount of damages to award each Rubin plaintiff,
the court considered the extent of each plaintiffs injuries, and awarded
both compensatory and punitive damages. 90
83. See id. at 262.
84. Id. at 269.
85. See id. at 270 (noting that "deadly terrorist attack [was] an act of extrajudi-
cial killing") (citing Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 18 (D.D.C. 1998)).
86. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 262; see also Determination Pursuant to
Section 6(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979-Iran, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02
(Jan. 23, 1984) (explaining that Iran has been designated state sponsor of terror-
ism since 1984).
87. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269-71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7)
(2003); Peterson v. Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2003); Elahi v. Iran, 124
F. Supp. 2d 97, 106-07 (D.D.C. 2000).
88. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
89. See id. at 262; see also Strachman Interviews, supra note 5.
90. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 263-68.
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a. Compensatory Damages
With respect to compensatory damages, the court recognized that
Jenny Rubin had suffered "permanent tinnitus, a constant ringing or buzz-
ing sound, which disrupts concentration and her ability to think and
sleep."9 ' Although she has received psychiatric treatment for her injuries,
Rubin still suffers from PTSD and has exhibited personality changes, in-
cluding the display of paranoia and fear.9 2 As a result, the court con-
cluded that she was entitled to recover $7,000,000 in compensatory
damages for her past and future pain and suffering. 93
Daniel Miller's injuries included "multiple shrapnel wounds to his
legs and left eye[,] and his permanent injuries include a hematoma in his
left leg, a permanent limp in his right leg, difficulty walking, permanent
hypersensitivity to sunlight, nerve damage to his fingers and hands, and
PTSD.' '94 The court concluded that he was entitled to $12,000,000 in
compensatory damages. 9 5
Abraham Mendelson "suffered severe burns and blast injuries includ-
ing a perforated eardrum, a partially severed right ear, partial hearing loss,
tinnitus, large scars, chronic headaches, and PTSD." 96 The court con-
cluded that he was also entitled to $12,000,000 in compensatory
damages.9
7
Stuart Hersh "suffered severe burns and blast injuries including a
sixty percent hearing loss, tinnitus, back pain, chronic ear infections, burn
scars, difficulty walking, PTSD, and psychomotor retardation."9 8 The
court concluded that he was also entitled to $12,000,000 in compensatory
damages. 99
Of the nine Rubin plaintiffs, Noam Rozenman was awarded the largest
compensatory damages award by the court because his injuries were the
most debilitating.10 0 The court found that Rozenman "suffered severe
burns and blast injuries, including tinnitus, perforated eardrums, chronic
ear infections, scars, nerve damage in his left leg and right hand, and
PTSD."' Rozenman's extremely severe burn injuries required six weeks
of hospitalization after the bombing, and "additional surgeries a year after
the bombing."1 0 2 Accordingly, the court concluded that he was entitled to
91. Id. at 265.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 275.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 275-76.
97. See id. at 276.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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$15,000,000 in compensatory damages for his past and future pain and
suffering.
10 3
The four plaintiffs who did not sustain direct physical injuries from
the bombing but who later served as caregivers for their injured relatives
were awarded recovery for their solatium. 10 4 Deborah Rubin, Elena
Rozenman and Tzvi Rozenman were each awarded $2,500,000 for the
grief and anguish they have suffered as a result of their children being
injured in the bombing. 10 5 Renay Frym-Stuart Hersh's wife-regards
herself as more of a nurse than a spouse because of the role she plays as
caregiver. 10 6 She was awarded $6,000,000 for the grief and anguish she
has suffered as the result of her husband's injuries from the bombing. 0 7
b. Punitive Damages
The FSIA also gives "courts... 'the power to award punitive damages
against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state in a case brought
under section 1605(a)(7).'" ' 108 The Campuzano court recognized that
"[p]unitive damages are intended to punish the defendants for the terror-
ist act itself."' 0 9 In determining its ability to award punitive damages, the
court examined other FSIA cases where Iran and agents of the Iranian
government were defendants. 1 0 Citing Surette v. Iran,11 ' the court noted
that "the FSIA expressly exempts a foreign state from liability for punitive
damages, but permits punitive damages to be assessed against an 'agency
or instrumentality' of a foreign state."
' 12
Courts consider four factors when calculating whether to award puni-
tive damages to a group of plaintiffs: "(1) the character of the defendants'
act; (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants
caused or intended to cause; (3) the need for deterrence; and (4) the
wealth of the defendants."' 13 Punitive damages can be awarded to "plain-
103. See id.
104. See id. at 276-77.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 277 (citing Kilburn v. Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003), affd,
Kilburn v. Socialists People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123 (D.D.C.
2004)); Cronin v. Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 235 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1606 (2003)), abrogated by Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d
1024 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2004)).
109. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
110. See id. at 277.
111. 231 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2002).
112. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 277 (citing Surette, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 273-
74).
113. Id. at 278 (citing Acree v. Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, 222-23 (D.D.C.
2003), vacated by, 370 F.3d 41 (D.D.C. 2004)).
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tiffs who are direct victims of terrorism and their estates, but not to plain-
tiffs who are family members of surviving victims."1 1 4
In calculating the amount of punitive damages to award, "courts have
used a multiple of three times Iran's annual expenditure on terrorism and
consequently have generally awarded $300,000,000 in punitive damages
per terrorism incident."' 1 5 The court considered the heinous nature of
the bombing, the extent of the harm the plaintiffs had suffered, the need
to deter Iran from engaging in further acts of extrajudicial killing and the
fact that MOIS had significant funds at its disposal. Accordingly, the court
awarded "punitive damages against all defendants, except for Iran, jointly
and severally in the amount of $300,000,000, to be shared equally among
the eight plaintiffs present at the bombing."' 1 6 Therefore, each of the
Campuzano and Rubin plaintiffs who were present at the bombing should
receive $37,500,000 in punitive damages.117
D. Enforcing the Judgment
The court's decision to grant default judgments against the defend-
ants was a victory for the Rubin plaintiffs, but their legal battle against Iran
was far from over. Although the default judgments were entered against
Iran and the other defendants in 2003, the plaintiffs have since been able
to collect only a miniscule amount of the damages awarded by the court.
After the judgment, the plaintiffs sought to attach and execute against
several bank accounts that contained assets associated with the Consulate
General of Iran." 18 A federal district court found that the funds were not
"being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular relations" and were thus
blocked assets. 119 As such, the accounts were subject to attachment and
execution under the TRIA, and the court therefore granted the plaintiffs'
motion for writ of execution. 1 20 Although the plaintiffs had achieved a
victory in court, they were not able to attach the assets because the assets
were constrained by a prior judgment creditor's lien. 1 2 1 The plaintiffs
similarly were unsuccessful in attaching Iranian funds held at the Bank of
114. Id. (citing Stem v. Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286, 302 (D.D.C. 2003); Acree,
271 F. Supp. 2d at 222-24; Eisenfeld v. Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000)).
115. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (citing Acree, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 222-
23).
116. Id. at 279 (citing Stern, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 300-01); see also Acree, 271 F.
Supp. 2d at 223-24).
117. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
118. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. CIV.A. 01-1655 (RMU), 2005
W'L 670770, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2005), vacated by Rubin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, No. CIV.A.01-1655 (RMU), 2008 WML 2232613 (D.D.C. 2008).
119. See id. at *4; see also Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-297, § 201 (d) (2) (B) (ii) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2002)).
120. See Rubin, 2005 WL 670770, at *4-5.
121. See Plaintiffs' Consolidated Memorandum of Law at 5 n.2, Rubin, 2005
W'L 670770.
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New York. 122 Next, the plaintiffs targeted real estate in Texas and suc-
ceeded in attaching the former residence of an Iranian prince. This
house was sold for $390,000.123
After deduction of the enormous out-of-pocket expenses in-
curred by plaintiffs at trial and during their collection proceed-
ings, and after division among the nine plaintiffs, the sum
yielded plaintiffs only very nominal amounts which constitute a
tiny fraction of even the post-judgment interest on their judg-
ment and an infinitesimal fraction (about 1/500) of the original
judgment itself.124
Searching for other Iranian assets in the United States that could be
attached, plaintiffs' counsel David Strachman learned about the Persepolis
Tablets. 125 Ironically, the tablets were brought to Strachman's attention
when he read positive press about the Oriental Institute's research and the
Institute's return of 300 more tablets to Iran.' 2 6 At the end of December,
2003, the plaintiffs registered their judgment in the United States District
Court in the Northern District of Illinois and began to earnestly pursue
attachment of the Herzfeld Collection, the Chogha Mish Collection and
the Persepolis Tablets. 12
7
1. The Herzfeld Collection
The Herzfeld Collection-purchased by the Field Museum for $7,300
in 1945 and still held there today-is a group of artifacts from Ernst
Herzfeld's personal collection. 128 The collection is mostly ancient Per-
sian, and consists of more than 1,000 objects, including pottery, bronze
and other metal objects, cylinder seals and figurines. Other items that
Herzfeld collected are also held in the Persian Gallery at the Oriental In-
stitute. 129 Iran has never claimed that it owns items from the Herzfeld
122. See Bank of N.Y. v. Rubin, No. CIV.A. 05-4926, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS
10215, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2006).
123. See Plaintiff's Consolidated Memorandum of Law, supra note 121, at 2
n.4.
124. Id.
125. See Strachman Interviews, supra note 5.
126. See id; see also William Harms, The University of Chicago Returns Ancient Per-
sian Tablets Loaned by Iran, U. Or CHI. NEWS OFFICE, Apr. 28, 2004, available at http:/
/wvw-news.uchicago.edu/releases/04/040428.tablets.shtml.
127. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-C9370, 2007 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 24376, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007).
128. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-24, Rubin, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS
24376; see also Motion by Field Museum of Natural History for Protective Order,
Attach (letter from Ernst Herzfeld to Orr Goodson dated 07/16/44 and letter
from C.C. Gregg to Ernst Herzfeld dated 08/22/45), Rubin, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS
24376.
129. See Peggy Horton Grant, Iranian Pottery in the Oriental Institute, ORIENTAL
INST., Apr. 16, 2008, http://oi.uchicago.edu/research/pubs/nn/sum94_grant.
html. In recalling subsequent additions of the museum collection, one expert re-
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Collection; nevertheless, the plaintiffs have submitted evidence that
Herzfeld was fired from the Oriental Institute for stealing antiquities-
either for himself or for sale to third parties.1 3 0 Therefore, the plaintiffs
claim that the ownership of the Herzfeld Collection is contested, and as-
sert that Iran owns the Persian artifacts in the collection.
2. The Chogha Mish Collection
The Chogha Mish collection-excavated at Chogha Mish, Iran be-
tween 1961 and 1978-is a relatively small collection of cuneiform writings
and clay fragments that have seal impressions.' 31 Research on the Chogha
Mish collection was finished in 2005, and the Oriental Institute had pre-
pared to ship the artifacts back to Iran pursuant to an earlier loan agree-
ment. The shipment was halted, however, by the State Department,
because of litigation before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 13 2
Until the Rubin plaintiffs' claim is resolved, the Oriental Institute cannot
ship the Chogha Mish Collection back to Iran. Furthermore, the Univer-
sity of Chicago has promised-as reflected in affidavits-not to transfer
the Chogha Mish Collection or the Persepolis Tablets back to Iran without
approval from the court.
13 3
3. The Persepolis Tablets
The Persepolis Tablets are the most well-known of the items in the
three collections that the plaintiffs are currently targeting. Speculation
about the tablets' fate-spawned by the Rubin litigation-has been dis-
cussed in numerous media accounts.' 3 4 The University of Chicago has
called, "[t]he next addition to our collection arrived in 1945, through the
purchase of part of the Herzfeld Collection, which had been offered for sale by the
Field Museum of Natural History. Kantor and Delougaz made a selection of the
most important and valuable pieces." Id.
130. See Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents at 6-8, Rubin,
2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 24376; see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-
C9370, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4651 (N.D. 11. Jan. 18, 2008) (ruling that plaintiffs
continue to be entitled to discovery from Iran on all relevant topics, including
Herzfeld's alleged predations).
131. See The Chogha Mish Project, ORIENTAL INST., Feb. 7, 2007, https://
oi.uchicago.edu/research/projects/cho; see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110 (N.D. IlI. 2004); Affidavit of Raymond Tindel at 2,
Rubin, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
132. See Motions of Citation Respondents, the University of Chicago and the
Oriental Institute, for Protective Order and for Rule 16 Conference and Order
[hereinafter Motions for Protective Order and Rule 16 Order] at 8, Rubin, 349 F.
Supp. 2d 1108; see also Rubin, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
133. See Motions for Protective Order and Rule 16 Order, supra note 132, at 2.
134. See, e.g., Cynthia Bowers, Art As Anti-Terrorism, CBS NEWS, Oct. 8, 2006,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stofies/2006/10/08/national/main2072581.
shtml; Ron Grossman, Persian Treasure Trove on the Line at U. of C., CHI. TRIBUNE,
June 28, 2006, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/north-
west/chi-0606280242jun28,1,1349936,pri.; Robin Pogrebin, In a Lawsuit Aimed at
Iran, Terror Victims Focus on Ancient Artifacts in a Chicago Museum, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
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repeatedly asserted that the Persepolis Tablets belong to Iran, and that the
Oriental Institute intends to return the remaining tablets to Iran after
completing its study and conservation of the tablets.' 35 The plaintiffs,
however, contend that ownership of the tablets is contested because
Herzfeld may have taken them from Iran without permission from the
Iranian government.
Whether the ownership of the Persepolis Tablets or other artifacts
that the plaintiffs seek to attach is contested is significant, because if own-
ership is indeed contested, then the assets would be "blocked" and thus
amenable to attachment under the TRIA:
Executive Order No. 12,170, issued November 14, 1979, blocked
all Iranian assets within the United States . . . Executive Order
No. 12,281 subsequently provided that all 'properties' of Iran
should be transferred according to the wishes of the Iranian gov-
ernment, effectively unblocking them .... The Treasury Depart-
ment regulations implementing this order defined the
'properties' that were unblocked as 'all uncontested and non-
contingent liabilities and property interests of the Government of
Iran'; 'contested' properties continued to be blocked.' 36
Therefore, if the ownership of the cultural property that the plaintiffs
seek to attach is not contested, then the property is not blocked and can-
not be attached under the TRIA.
E. The Defense Act
While the Rubin plaintiffs were waiting for Iran to comply with discov-
ery requests and were searching for other assets they could attach to en-
force their judgment against Iran, Congress enacted sweeping
amendments to the FSIA. Some of those amendments were designed to
assist terror victims. For example, Congress enacted section 1083 of the
Defense Act because terror victims were still finding justice in the United
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/18/arts/design/18pers.html?
_r=l&scp=l&sq=Robin+Pogrebin+July+18+2006&st=nyt&oref=slogin; Peter Slevin,
Iran, U.S.Alied in Protecting Artifacts, WASH. PosT,July 18, 2006, at A03; Archaeologi-
cal Institute of America, Insider: Embattled Tablets, ARCHAEOLOGY, Sept./Oct. 2006,
http://www.archaeology.org/0609/news/insider.html.
135. See, e.g., Affidavit of Matthew W. Stolper at 3, Rubin, 349 F. Supp. 2d
1108. According to the affidavit, "[t]he Persepolis Texts were recovered by
archaeological excavations in 1933, the legitimacy and legality of which have never
been questioned or doubted by either the Oriental Institute or any government of
Iran. Iran was fully aware of, and was a participant in, the Institute's recovery and
transfer of the materials to the United States, in 1936, for further study." Id.; see
also Stein, supra note 43, at 4.
136. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-C9370, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4651, at *17 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 18, 2008).
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States courts to be elusive, and were struggling to enforce judgments when
they were awarded remedies against state sponsors of terrorism. 137
President George W. Bush vetoed an earlier version of the Defense
Act due to concern that "particular provisions included in the bill risk
imposing financially devastating hardship on Iraq that will unacceptably
interfere with the political and economic progress everyone agrees is criti-
cally important to bringing our troops home." 138 The House Committee
on Armed Services altered the portion of the bill that prompted President
Bush's veto by inserting a waiver provision that "grant[ed] the President
the authority to waive the terror victim's provision only for cases in which
Iraq or its agencies, instrumentalities, or government actors are named
defendants."' 3 9 The waiver provision applies only to Iraq and does not
give the President the power to waive the Defense Act's application to ter-
rorist acts committed by Iran or other state sponsors of terrorism. 140 The
amended version of the Defense Act was signed into law by the President
on January 28, 2008.141
This new legislation addresses specific problems that were caused by
judicial misinterpretations of the language of earlier FSIA amend-
ments. 1 4 2 For example, courts had failed to fulfill Congress's intent to
provide meaningful remedies to terror victims because they had ruled er-
roneously that the Flatow Amendment provided a private right of action
against only individuals, not against foreign governments. 143 To rectify
that problem, the Defense Act repealed section 1605(a)(7) and enacted
137. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181, § 1083 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008)); see also National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008: Senate Record on H.R. 4986, 110th Cong. (2008)
[hereinafter Senate Record] (testimony of Senator Frank Lautenberg), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/record.xpd?id=I 1 0-s200801 22-25.
138. Fact Sheet: National Defense Authorization Act Section 1083: A Danger to Iraq's
Progress, Dec. 28, 2007 (White House press release noting President Bush's intent
to veto H.R. 1585), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/200712
28-3.html.
139. Senate Record, supra note 137 (testimony of Sen. Frank Lautenberg); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Waiver Section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008).
140. See supra note 139.
141. See President Bush Signs H.R. 4986, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 into Law, Jan. 28, 2008, available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2008/01/print/20080128-10.html (White House press
release noting that H.R. 4986 had been signed into law and noting President's
concern that certain provisions of Act purport to impose requirements that could
inhibit President's ability to exercise his authority and carry out his constitutional
obligations). The Executive branch intends to construe sections 841, 846, 1079
and 1222 of the Defense Act "in a manner consistent with the constitutional au-
thority of the President." Id.
142. See Senate Record, supra note 137 (testimony of Sen. Frank Lautenberg
noting instances when courts had misinterpreted language of AEDPA and Flatow
Amendment).
143. See id. (Sen. Frank Lautenberg discussing Cicippio-Puleo v. Iran, 353
F.3d 1024 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2004)).
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section 1605A in its place. 144 Section 1605A(c) creates a federal cause of
action for Americans who are victims of terrorist attacks that are sup-
ported by state sponsors of terrorism.' 45 Under section 1605A(c), a for-
eign state that is or was a designated state sponsor of terrorism can be held
liable for money damages when "any official, employee, or agent of that
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employ-
ment or agency" supports terrorist acts that cause injury or death to an
American national, a member of the American armed forces or other em-
ployee of the United States government who was acting within the scope of
employment.' 46 Those money damages may include "economic damages,
solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages."1 47 Furthermore, "a
foreign state shall be held liable for the acts of its officials, employees, or
agents. 1
48
The Defense Act also facilitates the enforcement of terror victims'
judgments. Because the new legislation includes a statutory veil-piercing
provision for judgments entered under section 1605A, a plaintiff will no
longer be forced to demonstrate that the state sponsor of terrorism who
caused the plaintiff's injuries exercises day-to-day control over the assets
the plaintiff seeks to attach. 149 Under the Defense Act, a plaintiff must
merely satisfy a simple ownership test.150
On March 26th, 2008, the Rubin plaintiffs-wishing to avail them-
selves of the above provisions and other remedies facilitated by the De-
fense Act-filed another civil action against Iran in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. 1 51 In their complaint, the
plaintiffs noted that they had contemporaneously "moved pursuant to
[section] 1083(c)(2) of the Defense Act to give their existing judgment
effect as if it had been given under [section] 1605A." 152 As of this writing,
this new Rubin litigation is also pending.
F. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran
The same month that the Rubin plaintiffs filed their new action
against Iran under section 1605A, a much larger group of terror plaintiffs
144. See 28 U.S.C. §1605A(c) (2008).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See § 1610(g)(1); see also Senate Record, supra note 137 (Sen. Frank
Lautenberg discussing manner in which courts had previously misapplied Bancec
doctrine, and recognizing Flatow family's inability to attach assets held at Bank of
Saderat Iran because family could not prove that Iran exercised day-to-day control
over those assets).
150. See § 1605A.
151. See Complaint at 4, Rubin, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 24376 (by filing this
related action less than 60 days after Defense Act was enacted, plaintiffs fulfilled
time limitation requirement imposed by § 1605A n.2(c) (ii)).
152. Id.
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who were attempting to enforce their own judgment against Iran regis-
tered their judgment in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. 153 The nearly 1,000 plaintiffs in Peterson v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran 54 are family members of murdered service-members and in-
jured survivors of the October 23, 1983 United States Marine barracks
bombing in Beirut. 155 The 241 American service-members who were
killed during that attack were in Lebanon as part of a multinational
peacekeeping coalition. 15 6 Because of the nature of their mission, the
American service-members possessed "neither combatant nor police pow-
ers.., and were more restricted in their use of force than an ordinary U.S.
citizen walking down a street in Washington, D.C." 15 7 Prior to September
11, 2001, the Beirut barracks bombing was the most deadly terrorist attack
on American citizens in United States history. 15 8 The suicide bomber who
drove the bomb-laden truck into the barracks was an Iranian citizen and a
member of Hezbollah. 159 According to one account, "[t]he resulting ex-
plosion was the largest non-nuclear explosion that had ever been deto-
nated on the face of the Earth." 160
In planning and carrying out the Beirut barracks bombing, Hezbollah
had received material support and assistance from Iran. 16 1 Accordingly,
the Peterson plaintiffs asserted that Iran was liable for the plaintiffs' injuries
under section 1605(a) (7).162 Iran failed to mount a defense in the Peter-
son litigation, and the plaintiffs were ultimately awarded a default judg-
ment of $2,656,944,877 against Iran and MOIS on September 7, 2007.163
153. See Registration of Foreign Judgment, Peterson v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
154. 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003).
155. See Peterson, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
156. See id. at 49-50.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 56 (describing bombing). Members of Hezbollah stole a 19-ton
truck and modified it so it could transport an explosive device. They then dis-
guised the truck as a water delivery truck, stole another truck that was to deliver
water to the barracks and replaced that truck with the bomb-laden truck. The
attackers then drove the bomb-laden truck to the barracks, crashed it through a
concertina wire barrier and a wall of sandbags and drove it into the center of the
barracks, where the bomb was detonated at 6:25 a.m. See id. (same).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 53-54.
162. See id. at 59-62 (noting that defendants were jointly and severally liable
for plaintiffs' injuries because court possessed personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants; statute of limitations under § 1605(f) did not bar action; Iran was designated
a state sponsor of terrorism at time of attack; Iran provided material support to
terrorist group that carried out attack and because other requirements of
§ 1605(a)(7) were also met).
163. See Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (noting that "[t]he Court hopes that
this extremely sizeable judgment will serve to aid in the healing process for these
plaintiffs, and simultaneously sound an alarm to the defendants that their unlawful
attacks on our citizens will not be tolerated").
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The Peterson plaintiffs and the Rubin plaintiffs share a common enemy
as victims of Iran's support of terrorism, but they became foes when the
Peterson plaintiffs registered their judgment in the Northern District of Illi-
nois and then targeted the Persepolis Tablets and the Chogha Mish Col-
lection. 164 In requesting an appointment of a receiver, the Peterson
plaintiffs asserted "[t] his is one of those unique cases in which a receiver's
entry into the Rubin litigation would serve the best interest of all the par-
ties, save Rubin, and maximize the financial return for these
[p]laintiffs."1 65 Among their many requests, the Peterson plaintiffs asked
the court "[t] o settle, resolve, terminate, negotiate any settlement, resolu-
tion or termination, or dispose of the Rubin [1]itigation as to The Univer-
sity of Chicago claim, subject to approval by this Court."166
The Peterson plaintiffs characterized Iran's interest in the Persepolis
Tablets as a "'general intangible' or 'residual right' akin to the classic 're-
mainder interest' on a perennial and perpetual basis.' 67 The plaintiffs
proposed that the court appoint three former federal judges recom-
mended by the plaintiffs as receivers, who would "take possession, custody
and control of the collections, and the residual interest therein," and "oust
Iran from the Rubin [litigation, and substitute the receivers as the ad-
verse parties."' 68 Additionally, the Peterson plaintiffs asked the court to
give the receivers the power "to solicit such offers to sell the residual
rights, which may include sealed bids, auction, consignment or brokerage,
subject to final court approval upon notice to all parties," and "to establish
one or more bank accounts to impound all proceeds" which could later be
distributed to the plaintiffs. 169
In their motion for a finding of relatedness and reassignment of the
Peterson case-which was before Judge Gettleman at that time-the Rubin
plaintiffs called Peterson's challenge to the Rubinjudgment creditors' pri-
ority lien against the property "frivolous," and asserted: "having two judges
of this Court hear competing claims to the same property from two differ-
ent groups of judgment creditors would be wasteful, and would create the
possibility of conflicting decisions regarding the disposition of the same
res."170 The Rubin plaintiffs' motion for a finding of relatedness and reas-
164. See Registration of Foreign Judgment, Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 25;
Memorandum of Law at 2, Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 25 [hereinafter Peterson
Memorandum of Law] (plaintiffs' request for appointment of receiver of Persepo-
lis Tablets and Chogha Mish Collection).
165. See Peterson Memorandum of Law, supra note 164, at 3.
166. Id. at 6.
167. Id. at 5.
168. Id. at 5.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Motion for Finding of Relatedness at 4, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, No. 03-C9370, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4651 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).
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signment of higher numbered case was granted, and both the Peterson liti-
gation and the Rubin litigation are currently before Judge Manning. 17
1
Subsequently, the Peterson plaintiffs experienced a setback in another
court. In attempting to enforce their judgment against Iran, the Peterson
plaintiffs sought to attach assets held atJapan Bank for International Co-
operation, the Bank of Japan and the Export Import Bank of Korea. 172
On July 7, 2008, District of Columbia Chief Judge Royce Lamberth con-
cluded that the garnishee banks were entitled to sovereign immunity in
the Peterson action because each bank was an agency or instrumentality of
its respective government under the FSIA.1 73 "As [the District Court for
the District of Columbia] has already discussed at length, the FSLA flatly
prohibits attachment and execution against property held by foreign states
and international organizations. The FSLA makes no exception for attach-
ment sought by a receiver."' 74 Accordingly, the Peterson court granted the
banks' motions to quash and denied the Peterson plaintiffs' motion for the
appointment of a receiver.175 As the pool of Iran's assets available for
attachment shrinks, the Peterson plaintiffs and the Rubin plaintiffs will un-
doubtedly be more determined in their quest to attach the Persepolis Tab-
lets and other Persian artifacts held in museums in the United States.
Part III focuses on the earlier legislative history of the FSIA and the
commercial activity exception, and explains why the Rubin plaintiffs are
wrong to assert that the loan of the Persepolis Tablets is commercial
activity.
III. THE FSIA AND COMMERCIAL AcrIWrv
The Rubin plaintiffs have set forth an additional principal ground for
attaching the Persepolis Tablets: the FSIA's commercial activity excep-
tion. 176 Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, foreign states were tradition-
ally considered immune from suit based on recognized principles of grace
and comity among sovereigns. 177 As foreign governments became increas-
ingly involved in business transactions and investments in the United
171. See Notification of Docket Entry, Rubin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4651;
Finding of Relatedness Pursuant to Local Rule 40.4, Peterson v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2007).
172. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 01-2094(RCL), 01-
2684(RCL), 2008 WL 2639239, at *1 (D.D.C. July 7, 2008).
173. See id. at *2-6 (noting that "FSIA prohibits attachment or any other judi-
cial process impeding the disbursement of developing funds from any organiza-
tion designated by the President as immune under the International Organizations
Act," 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a)).
174. Id. at *7.
175. See id.
176. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-C9370, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4651, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).
177. See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) (citing Verlinden v.
Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
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States, there arose a greater need to protect Americans from being disad-
vantaged in the marketplace.' 78
In 1952, the United States State Department recognized that immu-
nity from suit should no longer be granted to foreign sovereigns in all
situations. 179 At that time, the United States Department of State Acting
Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate drafted a letter to Acting Attorney General
Philip B. Perlman, recommending that a more restrictive policy on foreign
sovereign immunity be adopted because many Western European coun-
tries were already following similar restrictive policies on sovereign
immunity. 180
By then, the United States government was already subjecting itself to
contract and tort lawsuits in American courts, and was following a long-
standing policy of waiving immunity for its merchant vessels when the ves-
sels operated in foreign jurisdictions. 181 Furthermore, the State Depart-
ment concluded "that the widespread and increasing practice on the part
of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a
practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their
rights determined in the courts.' 8 2 Accordingly, the State Department
adopted a "restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of
requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity."1 83
Therefore, "under the Tate letter, the Department undertook, in future
sovereign immunity determinations, to recognize immunity in cases based
on a foreign state's public acts, but not in cases based on commercial or
private acts.'1 8 4
The Tate letter was a step in the right direction toward limiting sover-
eign immunity, but applying the new policy was at times problematic be-
cause the State Department did not have the resources "to take evidence,
to hear witnesses, or to afford appellate review."' 8 5 In addition, although
178. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov't Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 29 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Bruno A. Ris-
tau, Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Dept. of Justice):
The extraordinary increase of trading activities conducted by foreign
states in the United States since the end of World War II makes it desira-
ble that Congress legislate comprehensively regarding the competence of
American courts to adjudicate disputes between private parties and for-
eign states arising out of their commercial activities and other activities
which are of a private law nature.
Id.
179. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting U.S. Att'y General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEPT.
STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976).
185. Id.
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courts traditionally had the power to decide whether foreign sovereigns
would be granted immunity from suit, by conferring that power on the
Executive, the government placed private litigants at a disadvantage be-
cause the State Department sometimes yielded to pressure from foreign
sovereigns and granted immunity when it should have been withheld. 18
6
By the mid-1960s, the State Department and the Department of Jus-
tice began studying possible legislation that would provide more uniform,
fair results in the determination of whether foreign sovereign immunity
should be granted in a particular case. 1 87 The general purpose of the new
legislation was "[t]o assure that American citizens are not deprived of nor-
mal legal redress against foreign states who engage in ordinary commer-
cial transactions or who otherwise act as a private party would."'1 88
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of
sovereign immunity from the [E]xecutive branch to the
IJ]udicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implica-
tions of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that
these often crucial decisions are made from purely legal grounds
and under procedures that insure due process. 18 9
The legislators' efforts culminated in the adoption of the FSLA in 1976.190
By enacting the FSIA, Congress set "forth the sole and exclusive stan-
dards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by
foreign states before Federal and State courts in the United States."' 19 1
Congress defined:
[T]he jurisdiction of U.S. district courts in cases involving for-
eign states, procedures for commencing a lawsuit against foreign
states in both Federal and State courts, and circumstances under
which attachment and execution may be obtained against the
property of foreign states to satisfy a judgment against foreign
states in both Federal and State courts.1 9 2
Under the FSIA, foreign states are presumed immune from suit in United
States courts.' 93 The only way to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state
186. See id. at 9.
187. See id.
188. Hearings, supra note 178, at 24 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advi-
sor, Dept. of State).
189. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976).
190. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90
Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976)).
191. H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 12.
192. Id.
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976) ("[T]he property in the United States of a
foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution except as
provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.").
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defendant in a United States court is to bring suit under one of the FSIA's
immunity exceptions.' 9 4
The Rubin plaintiffs have established that the FSIA gives them jurisdic-
tion over Iran and have also asserted their legal right to execute or attach
the Persepolis Tablets and other items of cultural property. 195 First, the
plaintiffs assert that the artifacts are blocked and subject to attachment
under the TRIA, discussed in Part II. Second, the plaintiffs posit that the
artifacts are subject to attachment under the "commercial use" exception,
section 1610 of the FSIA.19 6
A. Legislative History and Operation of the Commercial Use Exception
The commercial use exception is consistent with a restrictive view of
sovereign immunity. The legislation furthers Congress's intent to provide
Americans with legal remedies "against foreign states who engage in ordi-
nary commercial transactions or who otherwise act as a private party
would."19 7 Under the commercial use exception: "[t]he property in the
United States of a foreign state . . .used for a commercial activity in the
United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution,
or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United
States or of a State". 198
The FSIA defines commercial activity as "either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular transaction or act."'199 Elaborating
further on what constitutes commercial activity, the FSIA states "that it]he
commercial nature of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose."20 0
Congress purposefully drafted a broad definition of "commercial ac-
tivity" in order to both provide legal redress for Americans injured by for-
eign sovereigns and to insure consistency with international law as it
existed at the time the FSIA was drafted.20 1 Testifying on international
laws that were in place at the time that the FSIA was drafted, Legal Advisor
from the Department of State Monroe Leigh said:
194. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1611 (1976) (describing immunity
exceptions).
195. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-C9370, 2007 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 24376, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007).
196. See id. at *21.
197. Hearings, supra note 178, at 24.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).
199. Id. § 1603(d).
200. Id.
201. See Hearings, supra note 178, at 24-25 (testimony of Monroe Leigh); see
also Weltover, Inc. v. Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1991) ("I]t would be
both unnecessary and unwise to attempt an excessively precise definition of com-
mercial activity.").
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Under international law today, a foreign state is entitled to sover-
eign immunity only in the cases based on its 'public' acts. How-
ever, where a lawsuit is based on a commercial transaction or
some other 'private' act of the foreign state, the foreign state is
not entitled to sovereign immunity. 2
0 2
Courts that have had difficulty determining whether a foreign state's activ-
ity was commercial have employed a "private person" test: "if the activity is
one in which a private person could engage, it is not entitled to
immunity. 20 3
Faced with the vague nature of the FSIA's definition of commercial
activity, courts have had to decide whether activity is commercial or not on
a case-by-case basis. Puzzling over the difference between "commercial"
and "sovereign," courts have rationalized that commercial and sovereign
are merely opposites: if an act is something only sovereigns can do, it is not
commercial. 20 4 "'Commercial' means only 'not sovereign,' as long as
there is some example of private action of a similar type connected with
'trade and traffic or commerce."' 20 5
Even the Supreme Court has expressed frustration with the FSIA's
ambiguous definition of commercial activity, saying the definition "leaves
the critical term 'commercial' largely undefined,"20 6 and calling the stan-
dard "too 'obtuse' to be of much help." 20 7 Analyzing how to apply the
definition of commercial activity, the Supreme Court reasoned that
"whether a state acts 'in the manner of' a private party is a question of
behavior, not motivation. '" 20 8
The Rubin plaintiffs "argue that [the] Persepolis and Chogha Mish
collections fall into the FSIA's commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a), because the collections have been used for publishing and sell-
ing books in the United States. '20 9 At first, Iran again failed to respond or
appear after the Rubin plaintiffs registered their judgment in Chicago.
The University of Chicago-as a third-party respondent-asserted that the
"[p]laintiffs cannot attach the Persian collections, nor demand discovery
based on the collections, until they demonstrate that a commercial activity
exception to [s]ection 1609 of the FSIA applies. '2 10 Accordingly, the
202. Hearings, supra note 178, at 25 (testimony of Monroe Leigh).
203. Tex. Trading v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Hear-
ings, supra note 178, at 24) (testimony of Monroe Leigh).
204. See Malewicz v. Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 298, 313 (D.D.C. 2005).
205. Id. (citing Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
206. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 607, 612.
207. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358 (1993) (citing Callejo v.
Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. 1985)).
208. Id. at 360.
209. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110-11
(N.D. Il1. 2004).
210. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 408 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (N.D. Ill.
2005).
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Rubin plaintiffs moved "for partial summary judgment establishing that as
a matter of law no party other than Iran may raise Iran's [s]ection 1609
immunity defenses."2 11
The court found that the University of Chicago lacked standing to
raise claims on Iran's behalf, because "no party other than Iran may assert
Iran's foreign sovereign immunity defenses under [s]ections 1609 and
1610 of the FSIA. ' '2 12 District Judge Manning agreed with Magistrate
Judge Ashman's report and recommendation that "foreign sovereign im-
munity . . . is an affirmative defense that must be asserted; and that the
citation respondents are not entitled to assert immunity on Iran's be-
half."2 13 Judge Manning's ruling prompted Iran to finally file an appear-
ance in July of 2006.214 The Rubin court subsequently held that "Iran's
conduct was not commercial, and that Iran's conduct is what triggers the
commercial activity exception. 2 15
B. Agency Theory
Unwilling to concede defeat, the Rubin plaintiffs pursued an agency
theory to support their position that the Persepolis Tablets and other Per-
sian artifacts are amenable to attachment:21 6
Plaintiffs argue that the University of Chicago is an agent of Iran,
and that acts of the University of Chicago that are attributable to
Iran are sufficient to constitute commercial activity, bringing Iran
within the commercial activity exception. 217
The court analyzed the language of the commercial activity exception-
section 1605(a)-and the commercial use exception, section 1610(a) (2):
"[t]he language in [section] 1610 supports the agency argument more
than the language in [section] 1605. In [section] 1605, the sentence's
actor is clearly the foreign state; in [section] 1610, the sentence is written
in passive voice, without an actor."21 8 After examining relevant precedent,
the Rubin court reasoned that the plaintiffs were "entitled to explore their
agency theory."2 19 The court, however, did not decide the merits of the
211. Id. at 551.
212. Id. at 563.
213. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 436 F. Supp. 2d 938, 946 (N.D. Ill.
2006).
214. See Attorney Appearance for Defendant Iran by Michael D. McCormick,
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-C9370, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24376, at
*23 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007) (explaining that Iran is represented by Berliner, Cor-.
coran & Rowe, L.L.P. in Washington, D.C. and by Michael D. McCormick in Chi-
cago, IL), opinion amended and superseded by Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No.
03-C9370, 2007 WL 1169701 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007)
215. Rubin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24376, at *23.
216. See id.
217. Id. at *24.
218. Id. at *27.
219. Id. at *29.
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plaintiffs' agency argument. Instead, the court held that even if the Orien-
tal Institute had used the Persepolis Tablets or the Chogha Mish artifacts
in commercial activity, the Oriental Institute must have had actual author-
ity to act on Iran's behalf in order to attribute that activity to Iran.220 The
court granted the plaintiffs' motion to seek additional discovery.22'
To support their agency argument, the plaintiffs have pointed to let-
ters exchanged between Iran and the Oriental Institute in the 1930s and
1940s. 222 That correspondence discussed the Oriental Institute's plans to
publish the results of research on the Persian artifacts, the Institute's in-
tention to give "a full account of [their] activities in behalf of [Iran]," that
"[t]he relationship between Iran and the Oriental Institute obligates it to
'report to the Embassy in Washington as each segment of the work is fin-
ished"' and other issues relating to the study and conservation of the
artifacts. 223
Those letters, however, merely show Iran acting in the role of a sover-
eign-arranging for the proper research, cataloging, preservation and safe
return of its country's cultural property.22 4 The relationship appears to be
more in the nature of bailor and bailee rather than one in which the Uni-
versity of Chicago is Iran's agent. 225 Moreover, the letters are void of
plans to use the artifacts as a profit-generating device either for Iran or for
the Oriental Institute.2 26
In fact, the Oriental Institute expended tremendous resources to re-
search the Iranian artifacts and is using the latest technology-including
lasers and CT scanning-to clean and analyze the tablets. 22 7 No souvenir
replicas of the Persepolis Tablets or Chogha Mish Collection have been
made for sale. The cost of cleaning, analyzing, cataloging, conserving and
storing the Persepolis Tablets and Chogha Mish antiquities far outweighs
any income that may have been derived from the Institute's publication of
scholarly books about the tablets. 22
8
Furthermore, "[n]o admission is charged for entry into the Oriental
Institute Museum, and all the work of the Oriental Institute relating to the
220. See id. at *27-29.
221. See id. at *40.
222. See id. at *24-25.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See MARIE C. MALARo, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLEC-
TIONS 240 (Smithsonian Books 1998); Marilyn E. Phelan, 2 NONPROFIT ENTER-
PRISES: CORPS., TRUSTS, AND Assoc. § 18:17 (Oct. 2007).
226. See Rubin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24376, at *7-8 (describing content of
letters).
227. See Persepolis Fortification Archive, supra note 27 (describing techniques
used to record and conserve tablets).
228. See, e.g., Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, Oriental Institute
Annual Reports, http://oi.uchicago.edu/research/pubs/ar/ (last visited Apr. 19,
2008) (listing sales figures for all Oriental Institute publications).
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two collections has been for scholarly, not commercial, purposes."
229
Moreover, "[t]he Persepolis Fortification Texts Collection is housed in an
extensive array of segregated boxes, shelves, and drawers, which are all
within the secure office of affiant Professor Matthew Stolper, whose office is
double locked within the fully alarmed and heavily secured Institute build-
ing."230 The Persepolis Tablets are not used as a lure to draw tourists to
the Oriental Institute. In fact, the tablets are not even on display.
23
"
The Rubin court has repeatedly granted the plaintiffs' motions for fur-
ther discovery, enabling the plaintiffs to both gather evidence that sup-
ports their arguments that the artifacts are blocked assets and are thus
amenable to attachment and execution under the FSIA commercial activ-
ity exception and the TRIA, and to discover further information about
Iran's assets. 23 2 Recently, Iran was chastised for obstructionist behavior:
Iran will comply with the [p]laintiffs' requests for general asset
discovery. The Court notes that it has been nearly five years since
this case began and eighteen months since Iran entered the pro-
ceeding, yet the litigation is still at the discovery stage. The Court
believes that the parties have had ample opportunity to litigate
the scope of discovery. Therefore, no further motions objecting
to discovery may be filed without leave of the Court.
233
Despite the court's orders, Iran has continued to resist cooperating with
the plaintiffs' discovery requests.
23 4
On May 23, 2008, Judge Manning again reminded Iran of its obliga-
tion to comply with discovery requests, and ordered Iran to produce the
requested materials by June 27, 2008.235 Under the terms of that order,
Iran must produce documents relating to the terms, conditions, nature
and purpose of Iran's loan of artifacts to the University of Chicago, as well
as to disputes regarding the ownership of Persian artifacts held at the Field
Museum or the University of Chicago and information Iran has about
Ernst Herzfeld's termination from the University of Chicago. 23 6 On June
23, 2008, the court clarified the scope of its May 23rd order and stated:
229. Motions for Protective Order and Rule 16 Order, supra note 132, at 3.
230. Id. at 4 (citing Stolper Aff. 13-15).
231. Id.
232. See Mullen, This Fossil Rocks, supra note 30.
233. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 C 9370, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4651, at *59-60 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (compelling Iran to comply with order).
234. See Iran's Objections to Magistrate Ashman's Memorandum and Order
ofJan. 18, 2008, Rubin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4651 (objecting to magistrate's order
that Iran comply with plaintiffs discovery requests).
235. See Minute Entry, May 23, 2008 at 5, Rubin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4651.
236. See id. at 2-5 (noting that discovery is available in aid of execution under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), that plaintiffs served discovery requests
properly and that Algiers Accords do not prohibit court from allowing Rubin to
request discovery about property that is subject of claim before Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal).
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[O]nce Iran filed an appearance in this case in order to assert
immunity from execution upon its assets, it also voluntarily obli-
gated itself to comply with requirements imposed on all litigants,
including the obligation to respond to requests for discovery. 23 7
Therefore, Iran is also obligated to identify all of its financial assets, real
estate holdings and other assets in the United States.2 38 Eventually, Iran
will be compelled to comply with the court's discovery orders under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 37, and will ultimately face possible sanctions.
Given the nature of the relationship between Iran and the Oriental Insti-
tute-as well as the nature of how the artifacts were used while in the
Oriental Institute's care-it appears very unlikely that the plaintiffs will
prevail on their agency argument, even after further discovery.
In considering how to rule, the Rubin court should recognize that its
decision will affect future research collaborations between American mu-
seums and foreign governments. Publication of scholarly research should
not-by itself-suffice as evidence of commercial activity. If research find-
ings are not published and shared with the world, knowledge of past cul-
tures will not be preserved.
With respect to the potential attachment and execution of art and
artifacts, commercial activity under the FSIA should be construed narrowly
in order to nurture and encourage the safeguarding of cultural property
for future generations. Nevertheless-as considered in Part IV below-
many museums are now sophisticated commercial enterprises with vast
revenues from ticket sales, merchandising, licensing agreements and cor-
porate sponsorships, all driven by the public exhibition of cultural arti-
facts. As such, application of the FSIA to artifacts displayed at these
institutions presents far more complex issues.
IV. MUSEUMS' ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
A. The Traditional Role of Museums
Museums have an ethical duty to "preserve, interpret and promote
the natural and cultural inheritance of humanity."239 Regardless of a mu-
seum's status as public or private, non-profit or for-profit, large or small,
its work must be done "in the furtherance of the public good. '2 40 Accord-
237. See Minute Entry, June 23, 2008, Rubin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4651.
238. See id. The court had previously misinterpreted the plaintiffs' requests
for discovery and had erroneously stated that the plaintiffs sought discovery only
relating to Persian artifacts in Chicago. See id. Therefore, plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration was granted. See id. Accordingly, Iran is obligated to respond to
requests for discovery that were the subject of that objection, including discovery
relating to Iran's assets in the United States. See id.
239. Int'l Council of Museums, ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums 1 (2006)
[hereinafter ICOM], available at http://icom.museum/code2006-eng.pdf.
240. Ass'n of Art Museum Dirs. (AAMD), Art Museums and the International
Exchange of Cultural Artifacts, http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/Cultural-
Property_000.pdf (Oct. 2001) at 1.
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ing to the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD), "[t] he experi-
ence of art fosters the appreciation of beauty and human ingenuity, and
promotes understanding among the diverse peoples and cultures. '2 41
In order to achieve these and other goals, all museum directors who
are members of the AAMD follow a code of ethics, and each museum di-
rector is "responsible for ensuring that the institution adopt and dissemi-
nate a code of ethics for the museum board, staff, and volunteers." 242
Some American museum directors are also members of the International
Council of Museums (ICOM) and follow ICOM's code of ethics. ICOM's
code of ethics sets minimum standards of practice and performance for
diverse facets of the operation of a museum, including: access, security,
funding, acquiring collections, removing collections, care of collections,
the care of primary evidence, research, display and exhibition, publica-
tions, return of cultural property, respect for communities served, profes-
sional conduct and conflicts of interest.24 3
Much of the impetus for following these ethical rules and other
guidelines is internal, an outgrowth of each museum director's personal
belief that he or she should serve the public trust. Nevertheless, there are
also more external pressures on museums today.244 Some of those pres-
sures are legal, including an increased awareness of the potential threat of
litigation that could lead to the loss of collection items through repatria-
tion.245 Other pressures are financial. Financial pressures necessitate that
museums engage in a variety of contractual arrangements that would con-
stitute commercial activity under the FSIA.
In our increasingly competitive economic environment, museums
know that they must become more focused on generating revenue if they
wish to keep their doors open. For instance, a 2001 study found:
On average, it costs a museum $46.51 to serve each person that
walks through its doors. These costs include not only the presen-
tation of exhibitions and public programs, but also the behind-
the-scenes costs of caring for the works in their collections, con-
ducting research, producing original publications, and develop-
ing educational programs for young people, teachers, and adults.
At the same time, the average admission paid by a visitor is $2.25.
241. Id.
242. See AAMD, About AAMD 2, http://wwv.aamd.org/about (last visited
March 19, 2008) (discussing code of ethics for museum directors). The AAMD
adopted its code of ethics in 1966 and has regularly reviewed and amended it. Id.
The AAMD has more than 190 active members who are directors of art museums
in the United States, Canada and Mexico. Id.
243. See ICOM, supra note 239 (setting standards for museum operations).
244. See MALARo, supra note 225, at xvii.
245. See, e.g., Jill Schachner Chanen, Art Attack, 92 A.B.A.J. 50, 50-56 (2006);
Cathleen McGuigan, Whose Art Is It?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 2007, at 54-57; Stephen
Salisbury, On Alert for Looted Art, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 13, 2006, at El; Ron
Stodghill, Do You Know Where That Art Has Been?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at § 3.
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Charging admission fees comparable to their expenses would
create an economic barrier to the public and undermine the mu-
seum's role as a public institution. Instead, museums establish
revenue streams to support institutional operating costs and to
protect the public from escalating admission and/or service us-
age fees. 246
Aside from the increasing costs of insurance, security and other oper-
ating expenses, museums confront the "ever-changing reality of a volatile
economy, shifting patterns of philanthropy, and the fluid demographics of
the American population." 247 From the museum's perspective, control-
ling costs to consumers while simultaneously providing an interesting and
interactive experience is becoming more difficult.
In the past, "museums were able to rely on a few donors or a primary
source of income," but today, museum directors "must develop and man-
age a highly diversified portfolio of revenue streams to ensure institutional
stability." 248 Museum directors must attract new visitors who will purchase
memberships in their institution. Unfortunately, even a steady stream of
patrons is not enough to keep a museum's doors open. To that end, ex-
hibit collaborations between art museums and for-profit enterprises "can
be mutually beneficial to the museum, the company, and audiences."
249
Working with catalog publishing companies, caf6 operations, travel agen-
cies, public relations firms and other for-profit enterprises can facilitate
revenue generation and "enable participation in major ventures that
would otherwise have been out of reach."
250
B. Blockbuster Exhibits as Commercial Activity Under the FSIA
One of the "major ventures" that has become increasingly common-
at least among large museums-is the blockbuster exhibit. Today, an in-
creasing number of museums strive to hold blockbuster exhibits that drive
ticket sales, increase museum gift shop revenues and facilitate corporate
sponsorship deals. 251 According to the AAMD, "[a]rt museums have a
unique responsibility to serve and educate the public through direct, per-
sonal encounters with works of art."'25 2 Nevertheless, some blockbuster
246. AAMD, Revenue Generation: An Investment in the Public Service of Art Muse-
urns, http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/RevenueGeneration_000.pdf I
(Oct. 2001) at 1 [hereinafter Revenue Generation] (citing 2001 AAMD Statistical
Survey).
247. Id. at 2.
248. Id.
249. EXHIBITION COLLABORATIONS, supra note 30.
250. Id. at 2.
251. See, e.g., ART MUSEUMS AND CORPORATE SPONSORS, supra note 30, at 2 (dis-
cussing tactics of some museums to increase revenue); EXHIBITION COLLABORA-
TIONS, supra note 30; see also Artner, supra note 30; Mullen, This Fossil Rocks, supra
note 30.
252. EXHIBITION COLLABORATIONS, supra note 30.
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exhibits have been criticized as flashy extravaganzas that are "all show, no
art. "253
In order to facilitate blockbuster exhibits that will hopefully serve as
cash infusions for their respective institutions, some museum directors
have entered into contractual arrangements with corporate sponsors and
foreign governments; such contractual relationships can create interests
that conflict with what should be the museum's core values. 254 The re-
mainder of Part IV describes several blockbuster exhibits that were com-
mercial successes, but were also derided by some scholars and art critics as
having sacrificed the integrity of the museums' educational mission and
other core values in favor of the glorification of commerce. Those block-
buster exhibits involved business practices that should be considered com-
mercial activity under the FSLA, including licensing images of the
exhibited items for fast food and theme park advertising, revenue sharing
arrangements and the sale of souvenirs.
1. The Field Museum's Acquisition of Sue
In 1997, the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago-the same
museum that owns the Herzfeld Collection-paid $8.4 million for the
forty-two foot long, beautifully preserved Tyrannosaurus rex dinosaur
commonly referred to as "Sue". 255 That purchase would not have been
possible without corporate sponsorship from McDonald's and Walt
Disney.2
56
The financial infusion from McDonald's and Walt Disney did not end
with generous contributions towards Sue's initial purchase. Indeed, "Mc-
Donald's also paid for th[e] glass-walled lab at the Field, where experts
preparing Sue's bones for display [were] on display themselves, and for a
CAT scan of Sue's skull." 257 For the first time, a museum's research labo-
ratory-officially named the McDonald's Preparation Laboratory-was
placed entirely in public view. The Field Museum hoped that putting re-
searchers and their work on display would raise public interest in paleon-
253. Artner, supra note 30.
254. See EXHIBITION COLLABORATIONS, supra note 30, at 5-6 (describing role of
core values to AAMD members). AAMD members subscribe to core values "which
guide all aspects of their work as museum professionals." Id. Core values include
specific statements about a museum's mission, individuality, accountability, integ-
rity and transparency. Id; see also ART MUSEUMS AND CORPORATE SPONSORS, supra
note 30, at 1-4.
255. See Mullen, This Fossil Rocks, supra note 30; Big Splash Public Relations, A
T-Rex Named Sue Case Study, http://www.bigsplashpr.com/SUEcase_study.htm
(last visited Mar. 16, 2008) [hereinafter A T-Rex Named Sue Case Study]; CNN Insight.
A Dinosaur Named Sue (CNN May 18, 2000), available at http://tran-
scripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0005/18/i_ins.00.html; Michelle Thaller, A Dino-
saur Named Sue, and the Way Science Really Works, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan.
25, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0125/p25s02-stss.html.
256. See supra note 255.
257. A T-Rex Named Sue Case Study, supra note 255.
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tology. 258 The new lab was built to be a permanent installation and is still
in use today.259
The museum hired additional staff to work at the new lab, and also
sent three preparators-along with some of Sue's bones-to a second lab-
oratory that was already in operation at Disney's Animal Kingdom in Or-
lando, Florida.260 At both the McDonald's Preparation Laboratory and
the Disney lab in Florida, preparators worked on Sue's bones while the
public watched. 26' Those researchers also gave talks to Field Museum visi-
tors and to visitors at Disney's Animal Kingdom at set times during the
day, where they explained the process of removing the fossilized bones
from the surrounding rocks that covered them.26 2
The Field Museum's public relations team spent more than two years
preparing for Sue's official unveiling on May 17, 2000.263 Their goal was
to create a spectacle that would set a new standard for museum blockbus-
ter exhibits. The unveiling resembled a movie premier; international
CEOs, respected scientists, schoolchildren and the media all gathered to
witness the spectacle:
The most respected minds in science mingled with the CEOs of
international corporations while crowds of schoolchildren gath-
ered in front of the imposing white curtain that concealed the
lady of the hour from her eager fans. Tyrannosaurus rex Sue had
been waiting 67 million years for this moment - her first public
appearance had to be perfect. The debut of Sue was a media
event on par with a blockbuster movie premier or a space shuttle
launch. In attendance were 250 members of the media, includ-
ing reporters, photographers and technical crews representing
all major wire services, all national TV morning shows, all major
TV and radio networks, and newspapers and magazines from
Paris to Tokyo, New York to Seattle. 264
On the day Sue was officially unveiled, more than 8,000 people
walked through the Field Museum's doors.26 5 Visitors from all over the
world continue coming to see the world's most famous dinosaur, bringing
their dollars with them to the Field Museum and to Chicago. Although
some trumpeted Sue's acquisition as a "genuine coup for the Field," some
scientists and individuals in the museum community were disturbed by the
price paid for the fossil, and by the Field Museum's partnership with Mc-
258. See Mullen, This Fossil Rocks, supra note 30.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See A T-Rex Named Sue Case Study, supra note 255 (describing cost of Ty-
rannosaurus rex exhibit).
264. Id. (describing unveiling).
265. See id.
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Donald's and Disney.266 Scientists have complained that Sue's $8.4 mil-
lion price tag has adversely impacted their ability to conduct research:
"[e]ssentially, everything turned at that sale. As soon as the hammer fell,
the world of paleontology... changed. It has unquestionably raised the
price of dinosaur research not only in the United States, but
worldwide." 2
67
According to critics, the higher price for dinosaur fossils has made it
all but impossible for museums to compete in the market for future acqui-
sitions of impressive specimens without also having corporate sponsor-
ships of their own. 268 Museum directors at some institutions abhor the
prospect that financial pressures might force them to consider agreeing to
have their fossils, artifacts or other cultural property in their collections
featured on fast food packaging, in theme parks or in some other form of
corporate merchandising. 2 69 Additionally, some museum directors fear
that corporate sponsors will demand control over the choice of informa-
tion content displayed in the exhibits. 2 70 Another argument against
blockbuster exhibits is that a museum's tax-exempt status as a non-profit
organization could be threatened if too much emphasis is placed on reve-
nue generation. 27I Although all of those points are valid criticisms, most
people in the museum community saw the collaboration between the
Field Museum, McDonald's and Disney as an innovation bordering on
brilliance. 272
266. See Mullen, This Fossil Rocks, supra note 30.
267. A T-Rex Named Sue Case Study, supra note 255.
268. See T.Rex Fossil Hunters Win Lease Ruling Appeal, Sioux CITY J., Apr. 6,
2007, available at http://www.siouxcityjournal.com/articles/2007/04/06/news/
south_dakota/673634417d8db70d862572b500v0cd95d.txt (illustrating high price
of fossils). Ajuvenile T-Rex fossil was discovered in South Dakota. Id. Before the
fossil was officially put up for sale, a potential buyer offered $8.5 million. Id.; see
also Sarda Sahney, High Stakes Custody Battle for Fossil Dinosaur Continues, http://fish
feet2007.blogspot.com/2007/04/high-stakes-custody-battle-for-fossil-07.html
(Apr. 7, 2007, 00:16 GMT).
269. See ART MUSEUMS AND CORPORTE SPoNsoRs, supra note 30, at 2 (discuss-
ing actions taken by some museum directors).
In managing their relationships with corporate sponsors, art museum di-
rectors face an additional challenge. Some corporations may engage in
unfavorable or unethical business practices, or may market controversial
products or services. Others may seek to showcase products or services
within the museum context or attempt to exert undue influence over the
content of museum programming. The museum director and his/her
board of trustees have the responsibility to determine whether sponsor-
ship of museum programs by such businesses is consistent with their insti-
tution's interests and to act accordingly in accepting and managing - or
rejecting - such sponsorship.
Id.
270. See id.; see also Mullen, This Fossil Rocks, supra note 30.
271. See Revenue Generation, supra note 246, at 1 (describing role of museum as
public institution).
272. See Mullen, This Fossil Rocks, supra note 30.
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2. King Tut
Whereas Sue was largely a triumph for the Field Museum-as well as a
dynamic model of success in corporate collaboration for other muse-
ums-the recent King Tut artifacts exhibits were more controversial.
American museums engaged in revenue sharing in order to induce Egypt
to loan the Tut artifacts and other art treasures for "Tutankhamun and the
Golden Age of the Pharaohs."2 73 Egypt received "the lion's share of the
receipts, reportedly about half the total take."2 74
Wanting a blockbuster production that would appeal to the masses,
Egypt's Supreme Council of Antiquities hired AEG Live to produce
"Tutankhamun and the Golden Age of the Pharaohs." AEG Live special-
izes in producing sporting events and rock concerts. 275 To design the ex-
hibits, Egypt hired AEI-the company that designed tours of artifacts from
the Titanic.
27 6
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Tut exhibit was flashy, and featured
pseudo-Egyptian music and mood lighting. Many viewers were disap-
pointed that the solid gold mask found on the mummy was not on display.
Some complained that they felt like animals being led to the slaughter
when they were herded into a dark crowded room, standing elbow to el-
bow, to watch a short film before they were permitted to see the arti-
facts.277 Some art critics called the exhibit "all show, no art" and
bemoaned the fact that little information was featured on exhibit walls
about the art from the period or how the artifacts were made. 278
The "Tutankhamun and the Golden Age of the Pharaohs" exhibit was
not beloved by critics, but was a resounding commercial success for the
museums and for Egypt. From the 2006 American Tut tour-and the
King Tut II tour that is scheduled to be in the United States in 2008-
Egypt is set to receive approximately $100 million. 279 Though these tours
were authorized by Egypt's Supreme Council of Antiquities-and al-
though revenues raised from the tour are supposed to be used to build
museums in Egypt and to conserve Egypt's pyramids and other ruins-
some people were angered that any country would demand such a large
sum for the loan of artifacts. 280 That American museums would pay a
273. See Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 314 (2005).
274. See Mullen, Tut, Tut, Tut, supra note 31.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See Author Observations at the Field Museum (describing comments
made by other museum visitors in December, 2006).
278. See, e.g., Artner, supra note 30.
279. See Mullen, Tut, Tut, Tut, supra note 31; Tracy Spurrier, Tut Talk, AR-
CHAEOLOGY, Dec. 11, 2006, http://www.archaeology.org/online/interviews/tut.
html.
280. See Mullen, Tut, Tut, Tut, supra note 31.
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nine-figure sum to a foreign government that commits human rights viola-
tions has also stirred outrage.28 I
Significantly, the latest Tut exhibit would not have been possible with-
out corporate sponsorship. The museums could not have yielded to
Egypt's monetary demands without the financial assistance that corporate
sponsorship provides. Exelon Corporation and other sponsors provided
them with that assistance. 282
No court has yet decided whether cultural property in a blockbuster
exhibit is amenable to attachment under the FSIA's commercial activity
exception. But even under a narrow interpretation of the FSIA's defini-
tion of commercial activity, a court would likely rule that the licensing of
images of exhibited items, the sale of souvenir replicas and revenue shar-
ing agreements on the scale of the recent Tut exhibit are all commercial
activity.
Museums will likely argue that all cultural property should be exempt
from attachment and execution under the FSIA. Otherwise-museums
will assert-foreign governments will cease lending cultural property to
American museums. That threat is exaggerated.
Even if the Rubin plaintiffs win their case, most foreign museums that
already loan art and artifacts will continue such cultural exchanges. Like
their American counterparts, foreign museums need steady revenue
streams to keep their doors open. The loaning of art feeds that goal and
often leads to cooperative agreements whereby American museums, in
turn, loan cultural property back to the foreign museums. Such agree-
ments enable both the United States and foreign museums to host block-
buster exhibits. In addition, foreign museums are aware that the federal
Immunity From Seizure Act ("IFSA") can protect foreign-owned art and
artifacts from seizure while such artifacts are on loan to American cultural
institutions.
V. LEGISLATION PROTECTING FOREIGN-OWNED CULTURAL PROPERTY
Whenever a foreign government loans cultural property to an Ameri-
can museum, the lender must consider certain risks, including the possi-
bility that the property might be damaged or stolen. Recent court cases
such as Rubin-as well as media reports-have highlighted the growing
281. See, e.g., Egypt: Events of 2007, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2008) http://
hrw.org/englishwr2k8/docs/2008/01/31/egyptl7595.htm (discussing human
rights violations committed in Egypt during 2007).
282. See Mullen, Tut, Tut, Tut, supra note 31 (explaining funding of Tut ex-
hibit). The Tut exhibit was nearly derailed because of Exelon CEO John Rowe's
penchant for collecting artifacts. See id. Zahi Hawass-the Secretary General of
Egypt's Supreme Council of Antiquities-learned that Rowe owned a 2,600-year-
old Egyptian sarcophagus and that Rowe was displaying the sarcophagus in his
office at Exelon. See id. Hawass demanded that Rowe either send the sarcophagus
to a museum, return it to Egypt or that Exelon withdraw from sponsoring the
exhibit. Id. Hawass withdrew that threat upon learning that Rowe had agreed to
give the sarcophagus to the Field Museum in an indefinite loan. See id.
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danger that another calamity will befall the loaned cultural property: the
property might be seized under court order to satisfy a judgment in unre-
lated litigation initiated in the United States against the lender. 283 With-
out some assurances that their cultural property will be protected from
"cultural kidnapping," foreign governments would not consider letting
their treasures enter United States borders.2 84
Existing art immunity legislation "fulfills an important role in foster-
ing the exchange of art and cultural works between this country and other
nations."28 5 Under the IFSA, a foreign state may apply for protection of
its cultural property before the cultural property enters the United
States. 286 If specified guidelines are met, the State Department can grant
immunity from seizure and other forms of judicial process.
When the IFSA was drafted, there had not yet been any action filed
against foreign-owned artworks that were on loan to American cultural
institutions. 28 7 Rather, the legislation was enacted as a prophylactic mea-
sure in reaction to the adoption of the Second Hickenlooper Amendment,
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2).288 The Second Hickenlooper Amendment
"sharply restricted application of the Act of State doctrine as a bar tojuris-
diction over claims to property allegedly taken in violation of international
law."28 9 After the Second Hickenlooper Amendment was enacted, some
foreign nations demanded legal assurances that their cultural property
would not be seized in a judicial proceeding if they were to loan it to an
American museum. 290 The IFSA provided that assurance; moreover, the
IFSA also served as a gesture of goodwill designed to promote cultural
exchanges with foreign governments, even those that had shaky relations
with the United States. 29 1
Protection from seizure under the IFSA is not automatic; rather, it
must be applied for, and certain standards must first be met. 292 First, the
object for which protection is sought must be culturally significant, and
must be imported into the United States for temporary exhibition at an
educational or cultural institution. Moreover, the exhibition must be in
the national interest, and must be administered, operated and sponsored
without profit. 293 The entity applying for the protection must provide in-
283. See, e.g., M o, supra note 225, at 316.
284. See Repatriation Note: Hostages, http://www.caslon.com.au/repatria-
tionnote6.htm (discussing litigation and attempts to seize loaned art).
285. See Malewicz v. Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (D.D.C. 2005).
286. See 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2008).
287. See 111 CONG. REc. 25, 928-29 (1965) (presenting questions from Mr.
Gross and responses from Mr. Rogers).
288. See Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See 111 CONG. REc. 25, 928-29 (1965) (presenting questions from Mr.
Gross and responses from Mr. Rogers).
292. See 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2008).
293. See id.
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formation on the planned exhibition, including: a description of each ob-
ject of cultural property that will be brought into the United States, a copy
of the loan agreement, a statement that describes whether the exhibition
is being conducted for profit and a statement that assesses the likelihood
of litigation attempting to attach one of the exhibited works of art.2 94
Whether the objects to be loaned are culturally significant and
whether the exhibition is in the national interest are important public pol-
icy considerations. A March 27, 1978, executive order provided guidelines
on how to determine whether an object was culturally significant and
whether an exhibition was in the national interest.29 5 According to the
order, the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute and the Director of the
National Gallery were to be consulted about items' cultural significance,
and the Secretary of State was to recommend whether or not an exhibit
was in the national interest.2 96
Between 1979 and 1999, only one application for immunity from
seizure under the IFSA was denied. 29 7 In 1980-shortly after Russia in-
vaded Afghanistan-the Hermitage Museum of Leningrad planned to
loan art to an American museum for a major exhibition. 298 The Hermit-
age Museum's application was denied.299 It is likely that this decision was
at least partially motivated by the strained relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union at that time.
More recently, in 2006, the proposed exhibit of the Baghdad Mu-
seum's Nimrud gold in Washington, D.C. was cancelled because the State
Department refused to grant immunity from seizure under the IFSA. The
gold artifacts were to have been exhibited in the United States at the
Sackler Gallery.3 0
0
The State Department's decision was motivated by several concerns.
Donny George-the chairman of the Iraq State Board of Antiquities and
Heritage at the time the exhibit was being planned-opposed the pro-
posed loan of the Nimrud gold to the Sackler Gallery.3 01 Additionally,
because of the value of the gold artifacts, security would have been a major
294. See id.
295. See Exec. Order No. 12,047, 43 Fed. Reg. 13, 359 (Mar. 27, 1978).
296. See id.
297. See Paul Richard, U.S. Will Not Allow Hermitage Art Tour, WASH. POST, Jan.
17, 1980, at BI (explaining that Hermitage could nevertheless have brought works
of art into United States for exhibition, but chose not to because immunity from
seizure was not granted).
298. See MA1ARo, supra note 225, at 317 n.8.
299. See id.
300. See Martin Bailey, Sackler Gallery Cancels Exhibition of Iraqi Gold, ART NEWS-
PAPER, Jan. 7, 2006, available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/article.asp?
id=335.
301. See id; see also Renowned Iraqi Scholar, Dr. Donny George Youkhanna, Ap-
pointed to Faculty at Stony Brook, GRADUATE RjV.: NEWSLETTER OF STONY BROOK U.
GRADUATE ScH., vol. 3, no. 4, Fall 2006, available at http://www.grad.sunysb.edu/
newsletter/George%20Youkhanna.htm (explaining that Dr. Youkhanna left Iraq
and later was appointed visiting professor at Stony Brook University in New York).
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concern, and military protection would have been needed to transport the
artifacts from one museum to another. The State Department was also
worried about the risk that legal action would be brought and would result
in attempted attachment and execution of the artifacts. Finally, because
the Sackler Gallery is a Smithsonian Museum that does not charge admis-
sion, the Gallery lacked the financial resources to pay for the operating
expenses for such a high-profile exhibit.30 2
American museumgoers lost a rare opportunity to view and learn
about these important artifacts, but the State Department's decision to
deny the IFSA immunity grant was reasonable. In 2006, the Iraqi museum
was still recovering after being looted during the ongoing war in that
country.30 3 And even if the Sackler Gallery had chosen to ally itself with a
corporate sponsor-and had thus raised the revenue necessary for the
show-the need for heightened security presence and other issues could
have turned the exhibit into a logistical nightmare.
If all of the IFSA requirements are met and immunity from seizure is
granted, then
[a] litigant with a claim against a foreign sovereign may not seize
that sovereign's property that is in this country on a cultural ex-
change and the litigant may not serve the receiving museum with
judicial process to interfere in any way with the physical custody
or control of the artworks. 30 4
The requirements that an institution must meet before its cultural
property is granted immunity from seizure are not stringent, but they do
provide the State Department proper discretion to withhold approval
when it is in the best interest of foreign policy relations.
Although protection under the IFSA must be applied for-and not all
applications are approved-New York, Rhode Island and Texas each have
fine art anti-seizure statutes that provide automatic protection for all
loaned art that enters their jurisdictions. 30 5 Those state statutes cover a
significantly broader class, and apply to both interstate and transnational
loans. 30 6 More importantly, unlike the federal statute, the state statutes do
not require the owner/exhibitor to take any affirmative measures to pro-
tect their artwork. 30 7 Rather, the state anti-seizure statutes protect any
fine art that meets specific criteria, regardless of whether the owner/ex-
hibitor intentionally and knowingly invokes protection. 30 8 Furthermore,
302. See Bailey, supra note 300.
303. See BOGDANOS & PATRICK, supra note 37, at 1.
304. See Malewicz v. Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
305. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (Consol. 2007); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 5-62-8 (2007); TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 61.081-61.082 (Vernon
2007).
306. See supra note 305.
307. See id.
308. See id.
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the art does not have to be culturally significant and the exhibition does
not have to be in the national interest.30 9 To qualify for protection under
these state statutes, a piece of art must merely be: (1) fine art en route or
held under the auspices or supervision of (2) any museum, college, uni-
versity or other nonprofit art gallery, institution or organization within any
city or county of the state (3) for any cultural, educational, charitable or
other purpose not conducted for profit to the exhibitor.31 0
Although at least facially the federal and state statutes that protect art
treasures from seizure may appear to protect the same interest, ultimately
the distinction between the laws lies in the class of owner/exhibitors
meant to be protected. The federal statute is largely incentive-based legis-
lation that was created to facilitate positive relations between the United
States and foreign nations. In contrast, the state statutes were created to
protect both the state-based art institutions and the respective local econo-
mies of each state. These differences in legislative intent create a distinc-
tion in application that should not be dismissed by the courts.
A grant of immunity from seizure under the IFSA provides most for-
eign lenders with sufficient assurances that their cultural property will not
be subject to attachment and execution while it is on loan to an American
cultural institution. But a large portion of cultural property falls outside
the purview of IFSA: loans predating the act. Significantly, the IFSA offers
no protection from seizure for the Persepolis Tablets or other artifacts
that were loaned to American museums before the legislation was enacted
in 1965.311
If Congress or state legislatures wish to grant stronger protections for
foreign-owned cultural property on loan to the United States, those bodies
can enact new legislation. Nevertheless, this Article concludes that grant-
ing automatic blanket protection for all foreign-owned cultural property
would do more harm than good. As the IFSA currently provides, the State
Department should have some discretion in determining, on a case-by-
case basis, whether granting immunity from seizure would be in the na-
tional interest. Granting automatic blanket protection from seizure for all
cultural property could even make cultural property more vulnerable to
looting.
VI. TERRORISTS' DESTRUCTION AND TRAFFICKING IN ARTIFACTS
Although museums may assert that terror victim plaintiffs are poor
guardians of the art treasures they seek to attach, the fundamentalist Is-
lamic regimes that sponsor terrorism have a poor track record as protec-
tors of ancient artifacts. For thousands of years, invading armies around
the world have destroyed cultural property in the lands that they con-
quered. Today, terrorists are using this same tactic of "cultural cleansing"
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2008).
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on their home ground to obliterate evidence that their ancestors once
espoused beliefs contrary to their own fundamentalist ideals.
Spurred by intolerance of other religions and values that they con-
sider "Western," terrorists have demolished sculptures that depict Buddha
and other sacred statuaries and have vandalized churches and archeologi-
cal excavations. They have also defaced artifacts that depict women as
goddesses or icons of beauty. The remainder of this section provides sev-
eral examples that illustrate terrorists' practice of "cultural cleansing."
Several weeks before Christmas in 2007, terrorists destroyed the
Bishop's Palace, a holy site of the Chaldean Church in Iraq. According to
one account, "a terrorist commando rushed in, forced priests and work-
men out, placed a bomb and blew it up. It was completely destroyed.13 12
The site was once considered the "most beautiful symbol of the Chaldean
Church in the whole of Iraq.1313
In 2006, the Palace of Darius was uncovered in the Fars province of
the Bolaghi Valley in Iran. 31 4 While Iranian and French archaeologists
were still excavating the remains of the great Achaemenid king's imperial
residence, bulldozers destroyed the crests of some of the remaining palace
walls.3 15 The damage was not the work of smugglers who were hoping to
uncover relics that could be sold on the black market, but a deliberate act
of vandalism.31 6
In 2001, the Taliban regime engaged in a spree of cultural destruc-
tion. The Buddhas of Bamiyan-two huge statues that were more than
175 feet tall and more than 1,500 years old-were hacked to pieces with
spades and picks, and were used as targets for anti-tank rockets and anti-
aircraft guns. Explosives completed the vicious annihilation. 317 Instead of
condemning the acts of vandalism, the Taliban Information and Culture
Minister, Qudratullah Jamal, appeared to take pride in the acts, saying:
"[o]ur soldiers are working hard to demolish the remaining parts. They
will come down soon. We are using everything at our disposal to destroy
them. There is no question of stopping."318
312. See Patriarch Delly Mourns the Destruction of the Most Beautiful Symbol of Iraq's
Chaldean Church, AsiANEwS.IT, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=
en&art=2068.
313. See id.
314. See Maryam Tabeshian, Palace of Darius the Great Discovered in Bolaghi
Gorge, CULTURAL HERITAGE NEWS AGENCY, May 15, 2006, available at http://
www.chnpress.com/news/?section=2&id=6374.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See Jason Burke, Idols Are Reduced to Rubble, OBSERVER, Mar. 4, 2001,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/mar/04/afghanistan.jasonburke; Jim
Shorthose, Unlawful Instruments and Goods: Afghanistan, Culture and the Taliban, CAP-
ITAL & CLASS, Spring 2003, available at http://findarticles.coM/p/articles/mi-qa37
80/is_200304/ai n9223674.
318. See Burke, supra note 317.
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Taliban militia also attacked the National Museum of Afghanistan.
Buddhist sculptures and other non-Islamic artifacts were destroyed, and
widespread looting occurred. But terrorists do not just destroy cultural
property, they also engage in trafficking thereof.
Particularly in the Middle East, terrorist organizations have funded
their operations in part through the sale of artifacts and antiquities. 319 In
Afghanistan, for instance, artifacts that are looted from the National Mu-
seum, stolen from archeological excavations or excavated from the
ground, are being smuggled across the border and are making their way to
London and other cities. Once there, the artifacts are purchased on the
black market by unscrupulous dealers and private individuals.3 20 In Iraq,
American soldiers have found stolen artifacts from the Iraq museum in
terrorist bunkers among caches of weapons and ammunition. 321
Only their trafficking in illicit narcotics, arms trafficking and money
laundering exceeds terrorists' trade in cultural property.32 2 This illicit cul-
tural property trade has led to murders, not simply because funds from
the sale of artifacts finance terror attacks, but also because the smugglers
often kill each other, and have murdered police officers who attempt to
protect archeological sites.3 23
VII. CONCLUSION
Because of the increased awareness of terrorists' trafficking in arti-
facts and the numerous incidents of the destruction of cultural property in
the Middle East, some people fear the return of the Persepolis Tablets to
Iran. Terrorist activity there may cause them to be damaged, destroyed or
stolen. Recent reports on Iran's hostile stance towards the United States
have heightened these concerns.
Iran spends approximately $100 million each year supporting Hamas
and other terrorist organizations.3 24 Some scholars and government offi-
cials have asserted that Iran poses a greater terrorist threat to the United
States than does any other foreign government.3 2 5 The United States has
now officially labeled Iran's Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organiza-
319. See, e.g., BOGDANOS & PATRICK, supra note 37, at 249; de la Torre, supra
note 37, at 10; Joel Leyden, Swift-Find: Terrorism Funded By Stolen Property, ISRAEL
NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 16, 2007, available at http://www.israelnewsagency.com/terror-
ismstolenpropertyswiftfindregistry881016.html.
320. See Christina Lamb, Looted Afghan Art Smuggled into UK, LONDON TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2006, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article
740135.ece.
321. See BOGDANOS & PATRICK, supra note 37, at 249.
322. See de la Torre, supra note 37, at 10.
323. See Lamb, supra note 320.
324. See Campuzano v. Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 262 (D.D.C. 2003).
325. See, e.g., Ilan Berman, The National Intelligence Guesstimate, AM. SPECTATOR,
Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://www.spectator.org/dsp-article.asp?art-id=12401.
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tion.32 6 Iran has refused to halt its production of uranium enrichment,
and relations between the United States and Iran are hostile. 327 Indeed,
the United States and other governments fear that Iran intends to pro-
duce nuclear weapons.
328
In the midst of negotiations over Iran's nuclear programs, Iran in-
creased its hostile stance by launching tests of long-range and middle-
range missiles and threatening to strike Tel Aviv and hit American ships in
the Persian Gulf and other American interests if Iran is attacked.329 Re-
sponding to Iran's show of force, the United States warned Iran that it will
"defend its interests and defend its allies."
330
326. See Robin Wright, Iranian Unit to Be Labeled 'Terrorist', WASH. POST, Aug.
15, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2007/08/14/AR2007081401662pf.html (announcing United States' decision
to designate Revolutionary Guard as terrorists); see also Anne Flaherty, Congress De-
nounces Iranian President, WASH. PosT, Sept. 25, 2007, available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/25/AR2007092500765.html;
Iranian Guards Vow to 'Punch' U.S., CNN.coM, Aug. 18, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/
2007/WORLD/meast/08/18/iran.guard/index.html; Barbara Starr, Iranian Boats
'Harass' U.S. Navy, Officials Say, CNN.coM, Jan. 7, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/WORLD/meast/01/07/iran.us.navy/index.html.
327. See, e.g., Mazzetti, supra note 12; Helene Cooper, Russia Delivers Nuclear
Fuel to Iran, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 2007, at Al, available at http://www2.tbo.com/
con tent/2007/dec/ 18/na-russia-delivers-nuclear-fuel-to-iran/?news-nationworld;
Iran Postpones Iraqi Security Talks with U.S.-Iraq, REUTERS, Feb. 14, 2008, http://
www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L14756588.htm; Iran Defiant on Anniversary
of Revolution, CNN.coM, Feb. 11, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/
meast/02/11/iran.29.ap/index.html; Adam Zagorin, Still Trying to Squeeze Iran,
TIME, Jan. 31, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1708789,00.html.
328. See, e.g., Mazzetti, supra note 12; Cooper, supra note 327; Iran Postpones
Iraqi Security Talks with U.S.-Iraq, supra note 327; Zagorin, supra note 327; see also
Charles Bremner, Sarkozy Talks of Bombing IfIran Gets Nuclear Arms, TIMES, Aug. 28,
2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2337190.ece;
Con Coughlin, Iran Resumes Work on Nuclear Equipment, N.Y. SUN, July 7, 2008, http:/
/www.nysun.com/foreign/iran-resumes-work-on-nuclear-equipment/81260/; Iran Begins
Processing Uranium Gas, Diplomats Assert, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A14, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html; Iran
Fires Rocket from Space Center, CNN.coM, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/
WORLD/meast/02/04/iran.rocket/index.html; George Jahn, Diplomats: Iran Us-
ing Gas in New Centrifuges, WASH. PosT, Feb. 14, 2008, at A19, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/13 /AR2008021303
248.html; Tim Shipman, Philip Sherwell & Carolynne Wheeler, Iran 'Hoodwinked'
CIA Over Nuclear Plans, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/12/09/wiran 109.xml.
329. See Alan Cowell, Iran Says It Test-Fired Missiles, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/ 10/world/asia/ l Oiran.html?_r=l&
hp&oref=slogin; Parisa Hafezi, Iran to "Hit Tel Aviv, U.S. ships" if Attacked, REUTERS,
July 8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSLYO828502200
80708; Zahra Hosseinian & Alistair Lyon, Iran Tests Missiles, Heightening Tension with
West, REUTERS, July 9, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL092
5390620080709.
330. See Michael Schwirtz & Alan Cowell, Rice Warns Iran That U.S. Will Defend
Allies, N.Y. TIMES,July 10, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/11/
world/middleeast/1 1 iran.html?_r=l &hp&oref=slogin.
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Though the Rubin plaintiffs have suffered a great injustice at the
hands of terrorists that were supported and trained by Iran, the Rubin
court should continue to decide the case based on existing federal law,
and cannot base its ruling on public policy considerations. Accordingly,
the Oriental Institute's research and scholarly publications on the Persep-
olis Tablets should not be considered commercial activity that would be
attributed to Iran.
Narrowly construed, the commercial activity exception protects the
core mission of museums, respects the sovereignty of foreign states and
allows terror victims to recover when foreign sovereigns seek financial gain
in the United States through the commercial exploitation of their cultural
property. Congress, state legislatures and the courts should respect the
balance struck under the existing FSIA and should resist calls from terror
victims or museums to alter this balance in their favor.
47
Hilton: Terror Victims at the Museum Gates: Testing the Commercial Activi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53: p. 479526
48
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss3/2
